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REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION:
TOWARD A COLOR-CONSCIOUS PROFESSIONAL
ETHIC FOR PROSECUTORS

Justin Murray*
ABSTRACT
Prosecutors,like mostAmericans, view the criminal-justicesystem asfundamentally race neutral.They are aware that blacks are stopped, searched,arrested,and
locked up in numbers that are vastly out of proportion to their fraction of the
overall population. Yet, they generally assume that this outcome is justified
because it reflects the sad reality that blacks commit a disproportionateshare of
crime in America. They are unable to detect the ways in which their own
discretionary choices-and those of other actors in the criminal-justice system,
such as legislators,police officers, andjurors-contributeto the staggering and
disproportionateincarcerationof black Americans.
In this Article, I aim to undermine this color-blindassessment of criminaljustice
and explain why prosecutors should embrace a color-conscious vision of their
professional duties. Color consciousness is complex and multi-dimensional. It
involves understanding the ways in which America's long history of segregation
generated the harsh socioeconomic conditions that lead so many young black
males into a life of crime. It also demands awareness of the frequency of racial
profiling and acknowledgment of the widely shared stereotypes that lead so many
Americans to automaticallyperceive black men as potentially dangerous, violent
and criminal.Finally,color consciousness recognizes the exclusion of blacks from
political power and how this exclusion shapes the substantive content of the
criminal law. Prosecutorsshould not only strive to acquire insight into how race
operates in the criminal-justicesystem, but also to allow these insights to guide
relevant aspects of their practice, including the ways in which they interact with
police, charge crimes, negotiateplea agreements, andpresent their case to jurors.
Taking these steps, particularlywhen they redound to the benefit of criminal
suspects and defendants, would departfrom the adversarial norm that largely
defines the professional ethics of American lawyers. Normally, attorneys are
expected to zealously represent the interests of their clients and to leave ultimate
decisions about what is fair and true to the judge andjury.
Prosecutorsare different. They have a dual obligationto serve both as vigorous
advocates within adversarialrelationshipsand as officers ofjustice. Currently,no
* J.D. 2010, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 2007, Harvard University; appellate attorney at the
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. My sincere thanks to David Luban, James Forman, and my
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uniform guidelines exist as to the relative weight of the two components of
prosecutors' dual roles, so they must make complex judgments about how to
negotiate the intrinsic dissonance of their professional identity in a range of
diferent situations. This Article advances a context-specific argumentthatprosecutors and the institutions that supervise them should be more concerned with
pursuingjustice than with being a vigorous adversarywhen dealing with the subtle
racialdimensions of their work.
INTRODUCTION

Disturbing levels of racial inequality persist across many different areas of
American life,' but the most extreme inequalities today lie within the criminaljustice system. Shortly after the triumphs of the 1960s civil-rights movement, the
rate of incarceration in America sped up dramatically. 2 Racial minorities (especially blacks, whom I focus on in this Article3 ) have borne the brunt of this
escalating predilection for punishment.4 If current trends continue, approximately

1. See Devah Pager, The Dynamics of Discrimination,in THE COLORS OF POVERTY- WHY RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARTIEs PERSIST 21-22, 26, 34-38 (Ann Chih Lin & David R. Harris eds., 2008).
2. See John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward,98 J. CRim. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 547, 550 (2008) ("U.S. prison population fluctuated gently from the 1920s to the 1970s, but by the

late 1970s it had started a slow and steady expansion that has continued unabated ever since."). Some
commentators believe that the temporal proximity of mass incarceration and civil-rights progress is no
coincidence. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY- LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
PoLTs 6-12 (1997) (indicating that many politicians and others deliberately connected race with crime in order
to indirectly undermine racial integration and the civil-rights movement); Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a
Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 261,
267-72 (2007) (arguing that with the demise of Jim Crow segregation, fearful whites needed an alternative
method for controlling blacks, and that mass incarceration fulfilled that need). However, others have identified

factors that are not obviously linked to race, and the causal debate remains inconclusive. See, e.g., William J.
Stuntz, UnequalJustice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 2040 (2008) (contending that state and national legislatures and
voters have displaced local control over urban crime policy and imposed unduly harsh and out-of-touch solutions
to city crime problems).
3. It is a limitation of this Article that it focuses primarily on blacks and whites, because the experiences of
non-black racial minorities in the criminal-justice system can be very different from those of blacks. My hope is
that future scholarship will close this gap by exploring how color-conscious prosecutors can serve the needs of
non-black minorities as well. For a general discussion of the varied encounters of different minority groups within
American criminal justice, see CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993).
4. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1974, 8.7% of black men and 2.3% of Hispanic men had
spent time in prison during the course of their lives (compared to 1.4% of white men); by 2001, the numbers had
risen to 16.6% of black men and 7.7% of Hispanic men (compared to 2.6% of white men). The percentage change
in lifetime likelihood-of-imprisonment for women of color was even more pronounced, approximately tripling
between 1974 and 2001 for both black and Hispanic women. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATIsTICs, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION,

1974-2001, at 1 (2003),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf (charting incarceration statistics). Other empirical sources
suggest slightly different figures for the incarceration rates among various racial groups; however, these
alternative statistics are similar enough that they tell the same general story about a vast incarceration disparity
between the races and a drastic increase in imprisonment between the 1970s and the present. See, e.g., BRUCE
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALrTY IN AMERICA 16 (2006) (stating that 8% of black men, 3% of Hispanic
men, and 1.6% of white men in America have been incarcerated).
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one-third of black males born in 2001 can expect to do prison time at some point in
their lives.5 As of 1995, approximately one-third of black men within the age range
of twenty to twenty-nine were under some form of criminal-justice supervisionprison, jail, probation, or parole 6 -and in some major cities (including Washington, D.C.), the fraction of young black men under such supervision reached or
exceeded fifty percent.! These shocking statistics highlight the enduring relevance
of race in America and the severe burdens that contemporary criminal justice
inflicts on many black individuals and communities.
Yet, many Americans do not believe that the severely disproportionate incarceration of blacks is a reason for reform. This passivity is linked to a widely shared
racial ideology that is often referred to as "color blindness."' The central premise
of color blindness is that race and racism are no longer relevant in post-segregation
America except for scattered individuals and groups on the fringe of society, such
as the Ku Klux Klan.9
This assumption serves as the foundation for an entire political theory about
how race operates in contemporary America. Color blindness teaches that the
demise of governmentally sanctioned segregation in the 1950s and 1960s ushered
in a new era of genuine equal opportunity for all races.' 0 Equal opportunity does
not guarantee equal outcomes and, indeed, color blindness acknowledges the
undeniable fact that outcomes between whites and blacks remain gravely unequal.
However, in a society of equal opportunity, unequal outcomes are not unjust;
rather, they simply reflect the lack of effort or ability of those who wind up on the
bottom. Thus, color blindness faults blacks-not whites or white-controlled
institutions-for the persistent racial inequalities in American society, including
disparities in the criminal-justice system."

5. See BONCZAR, supra note 4, at 1 (providing rates of incarceration for black men and additionally stating the
incarceration rate of black women as 5.6%). The incarceration figure for black men is closer to 80% if we account
for both jail and prison. See JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY- AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 48-49 (1996).
6. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Eric Lotke, Hobbling a Generation:Young African American Men in Washington, D.C. 's Criminal
Justice System-Five Years Later, 44 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 355, 357 (1998) (describing incarceration rates in
the District of Columbia).
8. The concept of color blindness was first prominently introduced into American law by Justice Harlan in his
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."). See generally infra Part L.A (defining the
concept of color blindness).
9. See infra Part I.A. 1.
10. Cf EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF

7 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that "socio-economic changes that
transpired in the 1950s and 1960s" gave rise to "laissez-faire racism" and color blindness).
11. See id. (describing "laissez-faire racism" as an ideology which "blames blacks themselves for their poorer
relative economic standing").
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
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The problem with this picture is that race remains psychologically and politically relevant in ways that most Americans do not care to admit. It is true that
conscious and overt prejudice has declined considerably since the end of Jim
Crow.12 However, the tendency of color blindness to narrowly define racism
exclusively in terms of conscious prejudice disguises the pervasive influence of
unconscious and institutional racism-two concepts that will be explained at
length as this Article proceeds.13
Psychological research has consistently shown that most Americans, even those
who sincerely profess their commitment to racial equality, continue to harbor
moderate to severe cognitive associations between blacks and a number of
negative characteristics, including the propensity for violence and crime.14 Because perceptions relating to these characteristics are central to many decisional
stages in the criminal-justice process, it should be no surprise that implicit bias
against blacks influences legislators in choosing what (or whom) to criminalize,15
police in deciding whom to stop and arrest,' 6 prosecutors in electing whom to
indict," and jurors in deliberating about whom to convict. 18
In order to improve this troubling state of affairs, many different actors must
transform the way they think about and address issues of race and crime. Police,
jurors, judges, community activists, probation officers, defense attorneys, the
media, legislators, voters, and others all have important roles to play. A single
article cannot possibly address all of the actors who might help in building a
racially equitable criminal-justice system. Accordingly, I will focus on one actor
who has extraordinary promise, yet who has been mostly overlooked as a potential
ally: the criminal prosecutor.19 My central thesis is that prosecutors can help build

12. See infra Part I.C.1.
13. See infra Part I.C.1 (describing unconscious racism), I.D.1 (describing institutional racism).
14. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
15. See infra Part I.C.3, I.D.1.
16. See infra Part I.B.1.
17. See infra Part I.C.1
18. See infra Part II.D.1.
19. Several scholars have recently begun to thoughtfully analyze the question of how prosecutors can
contribute to racial justice. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1285, 1296,
1300 (2008) (criticizing the "race-neutral stance [that] pervades long-standing prosecutorial norms and practice
traditions" and urging prosecutors to "honor the concept of human dignity" in their decisions relating to race);
Kerala Thie Cowart, On Responsible ProsecutorialDiscretion,44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 597, 604-08 (2009)
(exploring racial de-biasing strategies for prosecutors); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 18 (1998) [hereinafter Davis, Prosecution and Race]
("[P]rosecutors, through their overall duty to pursue justice, have the responsibility to use their discretion to help
eradicate the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the criminal justice system."); Ellen S. Podgor,
Race-ing Prosecutors' Ethics Codes, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461, 474 (2009) ("Broad prosecutorial
discretion provides prosecutors with the ability to move beyond merely matching conduct with statutes. It allows
prosecutors to correct bias within our legal system."); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor
and Racial Esteem, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393,396 (2009) [hereinafter Taslitz, Judging Jena'sD.A.] (calling
upon prosecutors to expand their commitment to justice in a way that encompasses "greater deliberation about the
raced cultural meanings of prosecutorial actions").
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a more racially equitable system of crime and punishment by abandoning a
color-blind, adversarial approach to the racial dimensions of their work and
embracing a color-conscious,non-adversarialorientation in its stead.

For purposes of this Article, "color consciousness" refers to three overlapping
ways of understanding and engaging race, each of which supplies practical insights
into how a prosecutor can contribute to racial justice: historical consciousness,
psychological consciousness, and political consciousness. I will briefly introduce
each.
Historical consciousness is the practice of interpreting contemporary race
relations within the context of their troubled past.20 Color consciousness perceives
links between the past and present that help to identify and confront present-day
vestiges of America's oppressive racial legacy. 2 1It is important for prosecutors to
develop this form of awareness, because they are well-positioned to counteract
persistent segregationist practices in the enforcement of the criminal law, such as
the use of racial profiles by police to target black individuals, black neighborhoods,
blacks who are "out of place" in a "white" neighborhood, and other policies that
continue to reinforce the social and geographic boundaries engineered by Jim
Crow. 22
Psychological consciousness means developing insight into the phenomenon of
unconscious racism. As mentioned previously, most Americans still view blacks,
particularly black males, with suspicion, and the automatic cognitive processes
that generate this perception have real potential to distort outcomes in the
criminal-justice system.2 3 Although these findings are disturbing, psychological
research has also illuminated the path forward: because most Americans sincerely
profess egalitarian and anti-racist values, they can mobilize these conscious beliefs
to counteract their unconscious biases, if they are made aware of those biases. 2 4 It
is precisely this awareness that color blindness fears and suppresses, and which
color consciousness invites.2 5 The insight that we will have less racism when race
and racism are brought out into the open has significant implications for the

However, this emerging body of scholarship remains in its infancy. First, it has not developed a systematic
normative foundation for its program of action. Second, it does not address the institutional constraints that
prosecutors must creatively negotiate as they strive to integrate color consciousness into their practice. Finally, it
tends to focus on situations where color consciousness and adversarial norms coincide (for instance, in the
effective prosecution of racially motivated hate crimes), and therefore it has largely overlooked the question of
how and why prosecutors should actively promote racial equity even when doing so conflicts with the role of
adversary. This Article tackles these and other under-explored issues.
20. See generallyinfra Part I.B.
21. See generally infra Part I.B (describing the concept of historical consciousness).
22. See infra Part I.B. I (explaining the status quo of racial profiling in America), II.C. 1-2 (providing ways that
prosecutors can confront racial profiling).
23. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part I.A.2.
25. See infra Part I.A.2.
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exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 2 6 trial advocacy, 27 and institutional policy for
prosecution offices. 28
Political consciousness involves understanding that America's legal institutions,
including the substantive criminal law, are not always race neutral. For most of the
time period during which American criminal law has evolved, blacks were almost
completely shut out of the political process-first by enslavement, and then by the
combined force of private racial violence and state-sanctioned segregation.2 9 Even
today, despite incredible progress over the past half century, black voices are still
severely underrepresented within institutions of political power. Consequently, the
criminal law continues to privilege the demands, needs, and fears (including
race-related fears) of whites and to discount those of blacks. 0
Color-conscious prosecutors must make a special effort to assess the justice
needs of the entire community they serve, particularly those whose voices are not
adequately reflected in the outcomes of majoritarian politics. They should develop
charging priorities and exercise discretion in a way that reflects the full range of
costs and benefits of enforcing particular criminal laws, not just the limited range
of costs and benefits reflected in the laws themselves.
Finally, I recognize that color-conscious prosecution as it is envisioned in this
Article is in tension with the adversarial norm that largely defines the professional
identity of American lawyers. However, all lawyers, and particularly prosecutors,
have a countervailing set of obligations as well. Prosecutors have a "dual role" to
serve both as vigorous advocates and also as "officers of justice."3 ' Prosecutors
must necessarily make difficult judgments about which component of their dual
role should take precedence in particular situations. I aim to show that prosecutors
should prioritize justice over the demands of adversarial posturing when confronting the complex racial dynamics of criminal prosecution.32
Part I of this Article defines color blindness and color consciousness and
describes how each perspective analyzes race, racism, and the current state of
American criminal justice. Part II identifies concrete ways for prosecutors to
promote racial justice by integrating the insights of color consciousness into their
work. Part II also explains why color-conscious, non-adversarial prosecution is a
better situational interpretation of the prosecutor's complex dual role than a
color-blind, adversarial approach. Part III explores how color-conscious prosecutors can productively engage with resistant institutional environments, as well as

26. See infra Part I.B-C.
27. See infra Part II.D.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW ch. 1 (3d rev. ed. 1974).

30. See infra Part I.C.3, I.D. I.
31. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics 355 (5th ed. 2009).
32. See infra Part II.
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the related issue of how prosecutorial institutions can support and encourage their
trial prosecutors to make racial equity a priority.
I. THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM ON TRIAL: COLOR-BLIND VERSUS
COLOR-CONSCIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CRIME
This Part defines color blindness and color consciousness and provides a
color-conscious analysis of the criminal-justice system that exposes severe justice
deficits. Color blindness and color consciousness provide sharply contrasting
understandings of racism and of how race operates in American criminal justice.
The dominant color-blind approach defines racism as the intentional classification
of individuals on the basis of race. Defining racism narrowly in terms of
intentional discrimination enables color-blind Americans to conclude that antiblack racism is largely an artifact of the pre-segregation past with little contemporary relevance, including in the criminal-justice system.34
By equating race-based classification with racism, color blindness is unable to
distinguish benign, oppression-correcting racial classifications (i.e., arguably affirmative action) from oppression-reinforcing discrimination (i.e., Jim Crow segregation). Failure to make this distinction supports the widely shared conviction that
the best way to eliminate racism in the criminal-justice system (and other social
institutions) is to purge racial classifications from our minds and repress racial
perception. Consequently, color blindness discourages open discussion of race and
condemns affirmative steps to set right the enduring consequences of past racial
injustices.
Most color-conscious perspectives agree with color-blind Americans that the
cultural significance of race and the nature of racism have changed for the better
with the demise of Jim Crow segregation.3 6 However, color-conscious scholarship
from a range of academic disciplines, as well as the lived experience of racial
minorities in America, reveals that racial perception and racism endure in less
conspicuous forms. Classic racial stereotypes are alive and well at the sub-

33. See supra note 8; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."). Since Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the concept of color blindness has become the official understanding of race and
racism in American law. For a discussion of this idea, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1991), and for a discussion of it in American society more broadly, see
BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 10, at 2-3.
34. See infra Part I.A. 1.
35. See infra Part I.A.2.
36. However, some scholars emphasize the continuities between slavery, segregation, and modern mass
incarceration to such an extent that they seem to deny that America has achieved any serious progress in the area
of racial justice. See, e.g., Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1043, 1047-54 (2010). However, even the deplorable status of racially disparate incarceration in present-day
America is an improvement over the lash, and it is clear that today's black Americans have possibilities for
advancement and freedom that were unthinkable in previous decades and centuries. Zeal to remedy contemporary
injustice should not compromise objectivity about the past.
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conscious level.3 Many of the cultural, economic, and political wounds inflicted
upon blacks through centuries of slavery and segregation remain unhealed, and
blacks-particularly young black males-feel the sting of those wounds with
particular severity in the criminal-justice arena." The three dimensions of color
consciousness that I explore in this Part-historical, psychological, and politicalprovide valuable insight into the subtle yet powerful ways in which unconscious
racial hostility and inherited disadvantage continue to shape the products of
criminal justice.
A. The Color-Blind Understandingof Race and CriminalJustice
This Section explores two interrelated characteristics of color blindness that
impact the experience of blacks in the criminal-justice system: its narrow definition of racism and its strategy for managing and suppressing racial perception.
1. Racism as Intentional,Race-Based Classification
A central ideological tenet of color blindness is the way in which it defines
racism. Color blindness defines a racist act as, "quite simply, an action taken on the
basis of race." 3 9 This definition applies to paradigmatic instances of oppressive
racism, such as Ku Klux Klan cross burnings, racial slurs, signs expressing that
minorities are not welcome, and other malicious acts that distinguish between
people based on race. Importantly, however, it also condemns black racial
consciousness, affirmative action, and other initiatives that aim to proactively
redress the consequences of historic discrimination. Even though such programs
do not discriminate against blacks, they do classify people based on race, to the
disadvantage of whites. Therefore, color-blind individuals accuse these initiatives
of "reverse discrimination."4 0
The color-blind definition of racism is just as important for what it leaves out as
for what it includes. By restricting the meaning of racism to intentionally
race-based actions, color blindness fails to label stereotyping-"unconscious
1
racism. Furthermore, because color-blind ideology identifies racism
racism" 4 -as
exclusively by reference to the intentions of individual persons, it does not
perceive racism in the collective failings of America's structures and institutions to
hear and heed the voices, needs, and perspectives of blacks: "institutional rac-

ism." 42

37. See infra Part I.C.
38. See infra Part LB, I.D.
39. Lino A. Graglia, itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial
Discriminationin Employment, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. Pot'Y 68, 71 (1991).
40. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and AnticlassificationValues in ConstitutionalStruggles
over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1533 (2004).
41. See generally infra Part I.C. 1 (describing the concept of unconscious racism).
42. See generally infra Part I.D.1 (describing the concept of institutional racism).
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These methodological limitations have far-reaching implications for the colorblind assessment of racial equity in the criminal-justice system. Color blindness
has dramatically narrowed the types of questions that Americans ask with respect
to race and criminal justice. It is no secret to anyone, including the color blind, that
blacks are imprisoned in numbers that are vastly out of proportion to their
representation in the American population,4 3 and this fact has generated enormous
discussion and debate for at least the past half-century." However, the vast
majority of that discussion-both in criminology circles and among the lay
public-focuses on whether disproportionate incarceration results primarily from
disproportionate rates of criminal offending among blacks, or from disproportionate targeting of blacks by law-enforcement officials.
That question is important because insofar as mass incarceration results from
the deliberate targeting of blacks, it merits our attention and concern. However, it
is disturbing that relatively few participants in the debate ever take the next step of
inquiring about the staggering damage that mass incarceration inflicts upon black
communities, or the underlying historical reasons why blacks commit a disproportionate share of crime in post-segregation America. In this way, the social dialogue
about black criminality reflects the color-blind obsession with intentional discrimination-in this case, whether law-enforcement officials are classifying crime
suspects based on race-and its corresponding indifference to the concrete effects
of American criminal justice on the lives of black people.4 5

43. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (providing various estimates of the incarceration rates for
blacks, Hispanics, and whites).
44. For a useful summary of this body of criminology scholarship, see Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Racial and
Ethnic Disparityand CriminalJustice: How Much Is Too Much?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 903, 906-32
(2010).
45. For instance, Alfred Blumstein, one of the leading criminologists to statistically investigate the causes of
racial disparity in American prisons, had this to say:
If ... the disproportionality results predominantly from some legally relevant difference between
the races, such as a corresponding differential involvement in crime, then the charge of "racism"
would not be justified. Indeed, it could be more harmful than helpful. The charge would wrongly
strain even further the already troubled race relations in U.S. society. Perhaps most important,
directing attention to a secondary issue rather than to the primary issue may well leave the primary
problem unaddressed.
Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionalityof United States' Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1261 (1983). Fortunately, unlike most criminologists, he later modified this position by
acknowledging that "[e]ven if all of this incarceration is totally legitimate in terms of law violation, it still must
give rise to major concern about the undesirability of so broad a use of this otherwise poorly regarded instrument
with so large a segment of an important part of the nation's population." Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison PopulationsRevisited, 64 U. COLo. L. REV. 743, 745 n.8 (1993); see infra Part I.D (explaining
why the social costs of large-scale and racially disparate incarceration are unacceptable regardless of the cause of
the disparity).
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2. Racial Repression as an Anti-Racism Strategy
The color-blind prescription for eliminating racism logically follows, almost
tautologically, from the manner in which it defines racism. It seeks to eliminate
racism by ending the classification of individuals on the basis of race. Chief Justice
Roberts captured the central idea behind this strategy when he wrote, on behalf of a
plurality of the Supreme Court, that "[tlhe way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."4 6
Color blindness makes no exception for purportedly benign racial classifications, such as affirmative action. Affirmative-action proponents contend that there
is an obvious difference between equality-reinforcing racial classifications and
oppressive ones,47 and that American society still needs benign classifications in
order to alleviate the wounds of past and present racial oppression.4 8 Color
blindness, however, rejects this distinction, in part because it sees "no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics."4 9 More fundamentally, interventions on behalf of racial minorities may
operate to the disadvantage of whites, which produces heated charges of "reverse
discrimination""o and helps explain why affirmative action is one of the most
controversial topics in American society today."
The concept of reverse racism is also used to condemn racial consciousness in
other contexts, including criminal justice. When blacks or other color-conscious
individuals attempt to have an open and candid discussion of the enduring
relevance of race in America's modem-day social and political institutions, they
are silenced with accusations of "playing the race card."5 2 In this way, color

46. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion).
47. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245-46 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
term 'affirmative action' is common and well understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows that people
understand the difference between good intentions and bad. As with any legal concept, some cases may be
difficult to classify, but our equal protection jurisprudence has identified a critical difference between state action
that imposes burdens on a disfavored few and state action that benefits the few 'in spite of' its adverse effects on
the many." (footnotes and quotation marks omitted)).
48. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve
Diversity andAvoid Racial Isolation in Elementaryand Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 297-305 (2009)
(arguing that governments must be given latitude to avoid racial isolation and create diverse schools in order to
eradicate racial oppression).
49. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
50. See Siegel, supra note 40, at 1533 (defining "reverse discrimination").
51. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 12 GERMAN L.J. 247, 267 (2011) ("[We must assume either that the adamant
disbelievers in racial equality suddenly converted and became racial equality's high priests, or more likely, that
what really outraged whites about affirmative action was merely that minorities were now getting something at
their expense.").
52. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CAL. L. REv. 1023, 1072 (2010) (quoting RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING
AsouT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 17 (2008)).
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blindness deflects attention away from the racially inequitable distribution of
social, economic, and political resources and the enduring legacy of segregation,
refocusing blame for sour race relations and socioeconomic outcomes on blacks.
Popular sources routinely admonish and scapegoat what they perceive as black
"resentment," 5 3 "victim mentality," 5 4 and "welfare dependency." 55
However, these patterns of discourse reveal that, despite their protestations to
the contrary, the proponents of color blindness are not truly blind to race. Instead,
color blindness represses (or claims never to see) that which it has already
perceived. In order to preserve the myth of equal opportunity and excuse whites for
the deplorably unequal distribution of resources between the races, color blindness
propagates an image of blacks as lazy, irresponsible, aggressive, and criminal. The
contemporary reasons put forward to explain the perceived racial merit gap are
different from those of the Jim Crow era-"whites today rely more on cultural
rather than biological tropes to explain blacks' position in this country, 5 -but the
substantive content of the underlying stereotypes remains fundamentally the same.
Whereas a "medically color-blind person is someone who cannot see what
others can," a "racially color-blind individual perceives race and then ignores it."5 7
Later Sections of the Article will show that the "blindsight" paradox that is central
to racial color blindness undermines its ability to productively manage racial
perception and combat contemporary forms of racism. 58
B. HistoricalConsciousness:Remembering a Racial Legacy
Color blindness draws a nearly absolute distinction between the racial oppression of slavery and segregation on the one hand, and the equal opportunity of the
post-segregation era on the other.5 9 Because explicit, governmentally enforced
racial classification largely ended with Jim Crow, and analogous types of racism in
the private sector became stigmatized (and, in many cases, legally prohibited6)
around the same time, color blindness sees present-day America as a place where

53. E.g., PETER

COLLIER

& DAVID HOROWITZ, THE RACE CARD: WHITE GuaT, BLACK RESENTMENT, AND THE

ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND JUSTICE (1997) (revealing language is reflected in the title and throughout the text).

54. E.g., SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM INAMERICA 118-19
(1998).
55. E.g., WILLIAM JUuUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 21 (1987).
56. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 10, at 7.

57. Gotanda, supra note 33, at 18.
58. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHio ST. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 1-2 (2007); see also infra Parts IC, H.B-D.
59. See Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth ofEqual Opportunity in a Color Blind Society, 36
AKRON L. REV. 693, 706 (2003).
60. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (prohibiting many forms of racism in the
private sector) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-17).
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people of all races are on an equal footing to pursue their goals.6 ' Consequently,
when color blindness is confronted with clear evidence of racially unequal
outcomes across many dimensions of American life-not only criminal justice, but
also education, employment, housing, and many others-it is reluctant to attribute
those inequalities to the oppression of the past. Instead, it lays blame for those
outcomes on the doorsteps of black individuals and their communities.62
The most fundamental feature of the contrasting approach-color consciousness-is that it analyzes contemporary race relations within the context of their
history.6 It need not deny the progress that has been made in race relations with
the demise of slavery and Jim Crow. 4 However, color-conscious individuals are
also keenly aware of the enduring marks that those institutions have left on the
fabric of American society, and they refuse to settle for less than "full racial
equality." 65
This Section describes two ways in which historical consciousness enhances our
insight into the criminal-justice system. First, the widespread practice of racial
profiling by law enforcement provides a powerful link between past and present by
reinforcing the racial geographic boundaries erected by Jim Crow. 6 6 Second, the
crime-producing effects of segregation and deprivation reveal that black individuals and communities are not exclusively responsible for the disproportionately
high levels of street crime committed by blacks. Although it is important and
empowering for blacks to accept responsibility for their individual actions and
collective future (as it is for any group), it is equally important for the white
majority to accept their share of responsibility for the past and present social
conditions that contribute to racially disparate patterns of criminal offending.
1. Racial Profiling: SegregationistPolicing in Present-DayAmerica
Nearly half a century after the official end of legally-sanctioned ("de jure")
segregation, America is still, as a factual matter, a segregated society ("de facto
segregation"). Our residential areas, schools, hospitals, churches, and other social
institutions still tend to come in colors of black and white. According to color

61. See Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the Struggle Against Racial
Oppression, 62 U. Mo. KAN. CYY L. REv. 651, 701 (1994).
62. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing color blindness's condemnation of racial
consciousness).
63. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1141 (2003) (exploring color-conscious
trial advocacy and prosecutorial discretion in a way that emphasizes history and genealogy).
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing changes in race relations since the end of Jim Crow).
65. Alfreda Robinson, Troubling "Settled" Waters: The Opportunity and Peril ofAfrican-American Reparations, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 139, 151-54 (2004).
66. See infra Part I.B.L.
67. See infra Part I.B.2.
68. See Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder Gentler Antiblack
Ideology, in RACIAL

AfffUDEs

IN THE 1990s: CONTINUrrY AND CHANGE 17-18 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin

eds., 1997) (describing the current state of defacto segregation).
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blindness, the absence of dejure segregation means that defacto segregation is not
a serious problem, because it merely reflects the voluntary choices of blacks and
whites about where to live, which schools to attend, etc.6
This laissez-faire account of de facto segregation obscures the many ways in
which modem American social institutions, including governmental institutions,
continue to enforce the geographic and social boundaries established by Jim Crow.
Police departments and individual officers frequently integrate race into the
"profile" of characteristics they use in determining which persons are most
suspicious. 70 The justification offered in support of these policies is that blacks
commit a disproportionate share of street crime, and therefore that it is statistically
rational to consider race as a factor in making stops and arrests. 1
In fairness to the proponents of profiling, the factual premise of this justification
is substantially accurate (though it is commonly exaggerated both in public
discourse and private psychology).7 2 It is not clear whether blacks are responsible
for a lopsided share of crime when all types of crime (including, for instance, white
collar crime) are accounted for,73 but it is well-established that blacks commit a
disproportionately large fraction of crime within the categories that police officers
on America's streets most frequently deal with.74
69. See I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 43, 43 (2009) ("We assume
that residential segregation along race lines is largely the result of individual preference, socio-economic status, or
perhaps a remnant of de jure segregation. We assume that the government's role in maintaining and perpetuating
segregation is a thing of the past.").
70. For a general summary of various types of racial profiling, see Jeanette Covington, Round Up the Usual
Suspects: Racial Profilingand the War on Drugs, in PETrr APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE

DARK FIGURE OF RACISM 27-40 (Dragan Milovanovic & Katheryn K. Russell eds., 2001) [hereinafter PETIT
APARTHEID].
71. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do-Well to the CriminalHistory Category:The Refinement ofthe
Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 99, 137 (2003) ("[T]he justification for racial
profiling often rests on the assumption of differential offending rates among different racial groups.").
72. See Jody D. Armour, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negrophobes,46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 791 (1994) ("For countless Americans, fears of black violence stem from the
complex interaction of cultural stereotypes, racial antagonisms, unremitting representations of black violence in
the mass media, and other elements. The tendency of individuals to credit only those statistics and images which
confirm their preexisting biases exacerbates these irrational influences. Thus, even if race does in some measure
increase the probability that an 'ambiguous' person is an assailant, defendants and factfinders will inevitably
exaggerate the weight properly accorded to this fact." (footnote omitted)).
73. This caveat is important, because many discussions of racial disparities in criminal offending rates focus
exclusively on traditional crime categories like drugs, assault, and murder, and ignore the disproportionate
involvement of whites in white collar crime. Some commentators have suggested that this tendency reveals the
degree to which society sees crime that blacks tend to commit as "real" crime, and that which whites commit as
pseudo-crime. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle:Black Crime, White Fears-Onthe Social
Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REv. 503, 508-22 (1994). However, Randall Kennedy has persuasively
countered that the emphasis on non-white collar crime is less a function of racial bias than the "sensible
perception that the harm wrought by [non-white collar crime] is more personally threatening than harms wrought
by [white collar crime]." RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 14 (1997).

74. Developing accurate methods for calculating real offense rates is challenging, in part because the potential
measures for which data is most readily available-such as arrest data-are likely to be distorted by the same
racial biases that influence the ultimate incarceration disparity. One common method for estimating real crime
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The most convincing objection to racial profiling does not challenge these
established facts, but instead debunks the implicit moral premise that high levels of
criminal offending by some blacks justifies treating all blacks as criminals. Most
racially-targeted stops and searches turn up no evidence of crime and do not result
in arrest.7 5 In these instances, the "only" harm done is the deep humiliation and
indignity to the innocent black person who was treated like a criminal solely
because of his or her race.7 Sadly, this harmful experience is shared in some form
by virtually all black Americans, 7 and it serves as a constant and vivid reminder
that color-blind white America does, in fact, "see" race.
The problem with racial profiling is not only that it frequently ensnares innocent
blacks, but also that it unevenly burdens blacks who do commit crimes with a
criminal record for doing the same sorts of things that whites consistently get away
with. The Supreme Court has authorized the police to engage in pretextual stops,7 8
and officers routinely use technical traffic laws against blacks as a pretext for drug
searches. They target black drivers-hence the phrase "driving while black"-for
minor traffic violations, not because they care about punishing those infractions
(which they ordinarily excuse), but as a justification to search for drugs or
weapons. 7 9 The result is that a higher fraction of factually-guilty blacks than
factually-guilty whites get caught, arrested, convicted, and imprisoned.

rates within crime categories in which the victim is also a witness relies on the victim's report on the race of the
perpetrator. See, e.g., Michael Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law PersonalCrimes, 43 AM. Soc.
REv. 93 (1978) (discussing victim reports). Such data is likely to be accurate in a strong majority of cases,
although, as with any method, it does have shortcomings. See MANN, supra note 3, at 30-32 (discussing several
problems with victim reports, including "[reliance] on the victim's definition of criminal acts," which may be
influenced by the race of the offender). Recent victim-report statistics for a wide range of crimes, including
robbery, rape, and assault, suggest that the offending rates among blacks are considerably higher than their
fractional share of the overall American population. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIcrIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2006, STATISTICAL TABLES, at tbl. 40, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf.
75. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and RacialProfiling: What's the Problem? 1-4 (Univ. of Chi.
L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 482, 2009) (summarizing numerous studies showing that blacks are stopped
more frequently than whites for searches that, on average, turn up less evidence of illegal behavior).
76. For a discussion of the under-appreciated costs of these dignity violations to black Americans, see JODY
DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 53
(1997).
77. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560-68 (1989) (discussing the high
percentage of the black population that has been subjected to such experiences). Despite its prevalence, this
dignity-based harm frequently goes unnoticed because it does not eventuate in arrest or formal processing within
the criminal-justice system. Numerous scholars have identified the tendency to overlook racism in the informal
stages of criminal-justice processes as a frequent defect in color-blind criminology. See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic
& Katheryn K. Russell, Introduction:PetitApartheid, in PETrrAPARTHEID, supra note 70, at xv-xxiii.
78. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that pretextual stops of automobiles are
permissible so long as there is any valid reason for the stop).
79. See Alberto B. Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren: Searching for Objective Evidence of the Fourth
Amendment on the Nation's Roads, 90 KY. L.J. 75, 80-84, 101 (2002) (discussing the frequent use of minor traffic
violations as pretexts for drug or weapons searches).

2012]

REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1555

Many police officers implicitly profile entire neighborhoods and communities,
which enables them to identify and investigate alleged racial "intruders." Blacks
who enter "white" neighborhoods are frequently questioned about the reasons for
their presence and harassed by police.80 This sort of policing was an integral
feature of Jim Crow segregation: officers constantly harassed minorities who
"ventured outside of their neighborhoods" and went "'out of their place"' as a way
of maintaining the racial order.8 ' Although neighborhood profiling is far less
prevalent than it was during the Jim Crow years, its persistence continues to
"perpetuate an apartheid-like relationship between minorities and the police."82
Unlike many of the other sources of racial injustice in the criminal-justice
system (discussed further below), color blindness is theoretically capable of
recognizing and condemning racial profiling. Racial profiling is by definition
racial classification, and it is often intentional; therefore, it fits comfortably within
the color-blind definition of racism. Thus, there is greater potential for colorblind and color-conscious individuals to build alliances in this area than elsewhere.
However, color-blind Americans are just as likely to deny or minimize the
reality of racial profiling as they are to acknowledge and oppose it, due to their firm
a priori assumption that anti-black racism in the post-segregation era is "rare,"
irrational, and "hateful." 84 Racial profiling is unethical, but it is not necessarily
irrational or malicious. As explained previously, there is a statistical rationale for
profiling: the fact of disproportionate commission of non-white collar crime by
blacks. This fact serves to obscure the extent of profiling and to supply grounds
for viewing profiling as rational and, therefore, non-racist. Consequently, color
blindness frequently underestimates both the empirical prevalence and the moral
injustice of profiling. Color consciousness is not burdened by these misperceptions, because it rejects the narrow color-blind conception of racism and evaluates
racial profiling with reference to its historical and institutional context, which
exposes it as an instrument of oppression and an obstacle to de-segregation."
Thus, color consciousness provides a more reliable basis than color blindness for
condemning the practice of racial profiling.

80. See Capers, supra note 69, at 46. Police also use racial-incongruity profiles, though in a different way, for
whites who wind up in urban black neighborhoods; police will frequently assume either that they are lost, or that
they are there to purchase drugs from inner-city blacks. See KENNEDY, supra note 73, at 141-42.
8 1. Sandra Bass, Out of Place: PetitApartheid and the Police, in PETrr APARTHEID, supra note 70, at 46.
82. Id.
83. See generally supra Part I.A.1 (describing the color-blind definition of racism as intentional racial
classification).
84. BARBARA TREPAGNIER, SILENT RACISM: How WELL-MEANING WHITE PEOPLE PERPETUATE THE RACIAL
DIVIDE 3 (2006); see supra Part I.A. I.
85. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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2. The Social Contextfor Assigning Moral Blame and Responsibilityfor Black
Crime
The previous subsection established the uncomfortable yet accurate fact that,
within certain crime categories, blacks as a group commit crime at higher rates
than other racial groups. This fact has a troubling yet understandable propensity
to legitimize the status quo. Color blindness concludes-more precisely, it assumes-that insofar as blacks commit a disproportionate share of crime, then the
severely disproportionate incarceration of blacks is justified, blacks are fully to
blame for their high incarceration rates, and remedial interventions are uncalled
for.88
This ethical conclusion, however, does not follow from the factual premise.
Assigning all of the blame for black criminality to the individual perpetrators and
the communities from which they come is sociologically naive and ethically
irresponsible. It obscures the fact that black crime takes place within a historical
and social context, and that all Americans-past and present, of all racial
groups-are collectively responsible for producing that context. Studies have
demonstrated that social conditions imposed upon black communities during
centuries of slavery and segregation-conditions of poverty, educational deprivation, familial disruption, social disorganization, civic alienation, among othersendure to this day and are the fundamental causes of high crime rates within those
communities. 90
Even though most whites who live today have never personally contributed to
the Jim Crow regime of prior decades, they are the beneficiaries of a racially
stratified system of privilege that came at the expense of past and present
generations of blacks. 9 ' The ethical responsibility of white Americans in our
generation is to voluntarily relinquish this racial privilege in favor of a more
equitable society. This obligation requires taking measures that enhance the social
position of blacks. At the very least, it means putting an end to policies and
practices that further reinforce the subordination of blacks. If, as individuals and as
a community, we are unwilling to make genuine progress in these areas, then we
cannot disclaim our individual and collective complicity in racial inequality.
I do not mean to suggest that blacks are not personally responsible for their
actions, or that blacks do not have a central role to play in overcoming criminality

87. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
88. Cf supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
89. See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 844 (1997)
[hereinafter Butler, Affirmative Action] ("[Blut for the fruits of slavery and entrenched racism, African Americans
would not find themselves disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system.").
90. See SHAUN L. GABBIDON, CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CRIME 49-82 (2007) (summarizing

scholarship on the social causes of racially disproportionate criminality).
91. This dynamic is frequently referred to as "white privilege." See generally ROBERT JENSEN, THE HEART OF
wHITENESS: CONFRONTING RACE, RACISM AND WHTTE PRIVILEGE (2005).
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and deprivation. Rather, my analysis calls for expanding responsibility to all racial
groups by revealing how Americans "as a collective body are implicated in [the
criminal-justice] disparity." 92 All Americans-whites, blacks, and others-must
jointly bear responsibility for achieving a genuine end to racially linked deprivation. Collectivizing responsibility for black criminality provides the normative
foundation for the color-conscious interventions that I will propose later in the
Article.
C. PsychologicalConsciousness:Detecting UnconsciousRacism
The historical oppression of racial minorities has left a deep imprint on the
American psyche. Racism is not, as color blindness would suggest, limited to the
malicious and intentional subordination of racial minorities. More commonly,
racism involves widely shared unconscious stereotypes about blacks: stereotypes
that were initially forged by the engineers of racial animosity in the days of slavery
and Jim Crow, but which remain with us today as the psychological residue of the
past."
This Section begins by introducing the concept of unconscious racism and the
related cognitive phenomena of in-grouping and out-grouping. I then proceed to
document a cluster of mutually reinforcing stereotypes about blacks-their perceived dangerousness, criminality, and culpability-and a number of ways in
which those stereotypes operate to the disadvantage of blacks within the criminaljustice system.
1. The Structure of Unconscious Racism
The nature of racism in American society has evolved substantially since the
days of Jim Crow. The labels "racism" and "racist" are considered grave insults
today, and racial prejudice is no longer socially acceptable. 94 Studies report that
over the past few decades, the number of Americans who publicly express negative
attitudes about race has declined precipitously. 95 Color blindness takes these
self-reported attitudes at face value and concludes that Americans, by and large, no
longer harbor racial prejudice.
This premature inference arises out of the "inability [of color blindness] to
recognize the changing face of racism in America."96 Racial bias is drastically

92. GLENN LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUEs 36 (2008).

93. See infra Part I.C.I.
94. See Ann C. McGinley, DiscriminationRedefined, 75 Mo. L. REV. 443, 456 (2010) ("Our society has
reacted strongly to the issue of race, making the overt racial reference unacceptable and the term 'racist' one ofthe
worst insults in the language. This result has caused racial discrimination against racial minorities to go
underground. . . .").
95. See JAMES WALLER, FACE TO FACE: THE CHANGING STArE OF RACISM ACROSS AMERICA 107 (1998)
(summarizing relevant studies).

96. Id. at 100.
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underreported for two primary reasons. First, Americans who are aware and
accepting of their own racial stereotypes "know better than to say so, except to a
secure, like-minded audience, given that many people live and work in environments where they can be slapped on the wrist, publicly humiliated, or sacked for
saying anything that smacks of an 'ism." 9 7
Perhaps more importantly, many Americans are simply unaware of their own
biases. Color blindness instructs white Americans to think no evil and speak no
evil: they must not only refrain from racist actions, but they must purge and deny
all conscious racial distinctions." As a general matter, color-blind Americans
sincerely believe that they have little or no racial bias worth reporting.
However, a well-developed body of psychological research has proven otherwise. Many studies have utilized what is called an implicit association test ("IAT"),
which measures cognitive associations by examining people's response speed and
accuracy in linking faces with concepts. 9 9 The IAT has diverse applications outside
the context of race as well, but one of the most well-known IATs asks participants
to pair together words representing "Good" and "Bad" with photos of black and
white individuals. 0 o Studies of this type have consistently found that a strong
majority of test subjects tended to pair good with white and bad with black.'0 o
Significantly, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans all share this implicit white
preference, though their preference is not as strong or consistent as that of
whites.1 0 2 One particularly relevant and recent IAT study found strong implicit
associations between black faces and the concept of criminal guilt. 0 3 These
findings have been further confirmed by studies using different, non-IAT methodologies,1" some of which are discussed in the next subsection.
Race also continues to be an important factor in the psychological construction
of in-groups and out-groups. In-grouping and out-grouping are more-or-less
universal psychological shortcuts that human beings use in order to determine,
based on a limited amount of information, who seems familiar, safe, and trustwor-

97. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOTr ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BuT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JusTIFY FOOLISH
BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 62-63 (2007).
98. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing color blindness's unwillingness to recognize either benign or malignant
racial distinctions).
99. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (describing the IAT).
100. See, e.g., id.. at 1464-65.
101. See, e.g., id. at 1464-66, 1474.
102. See Brian A. Nosek et al., HarvestingImplicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web
Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (providing preference statistics of the various racial groups).
103. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty ImplicitAssociation
Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010) (discussing the so-called guilty/not guilty IAT).
104. Some alternative methods for exploring implicit bias include subliminal priming techniques and
brain-imaging techniques. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious RacialBias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1198 n.9 (2009) (citing studies).
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thy.10 5 People are drawn to those whom they perceive as more like themselves, and
they tend to be suspicious and cautious with those whom they view as different.10 6
In present-day America, race remains highly salient for in-grouping and outgrouping among both blacks and whites. 10 7
Race-based out-grouping has predictable implications that are discussed further
in the next subsection (such as whites perceiving blacks as presumptively dangerous and culpable), but also some less well-recognized consequences. For instance,
people tend to notice the unique and individual characteristics of familiar, in-group
members, whereas they are prone to focus on the stereotypical, group-based
characteristics of out-group individuals.' 0 8 When a white person encounters
another white, he or she does not focus on the other's race, but instead processes
the unique, individuating attributes (both physical and personal) of the other
person.'09 By contrast, when a white interacts with a black stranger (or vice versa),
psychological processing of the other is much more likely to emphasize race and
attributes that are implicitly associated with race (such as "threat"), and to
downplay personal traits that do not conform to racial stereotypes."1 0
There is nothing intentional or malicious about this psychological process.
Nonetheless, in the criminal-justice context, it can result in cross-racial misidentifications by witnesses and, consequently, false convictions. Numerous studies
have documented "a significant difference in the ability of white American
subjects to recognize white and black faces,""' and these findings comport with
the feeling of many white Americans that members of other racial groups "all look
alike to me." 1 l 2 Because the outcome of many criminal trials hinges on the
eyewitness testimony of one person or a small group of people, the inability of
many whites to visually distinguish in an effective way between black individuals
presents a serious obstacle to racial justice and the presumption of innocence.

105. See, e.g., MARY MAXWELL, HUMAN EvOLUTION: A PHLOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 155-56 (1984)

(discussing racial stereotyping as an evolutionary trick by which persons can quickly be sorted into in-groups and
out-groups).
106. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of CriticalRace Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1757, 1795 (2003) ("In concrete terms, people are more likely to demonstrate [trust, fairness, and loyalty] to those
they perceive to be members of their in-group. Conversely, they are more likely to discriminate against those they
perceive to be members of an out-group." (footnotes omitted)).
107. See id. at 1795-96 ("Race, being both socially salient and facially visible, is one of the primary categories
along which people make initial in-group and out-group categorizations.").
108. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: The
Informants Example, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 1091, 1101 (2008).
109. See id. at 1102.
110. Id.
Ill. Sherri Lynn Johnson, Cross-RacialIdentificationErrors in CriminalCases,69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 938
(1984).
112. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Recognizing Faces of OtherEthnic Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 36, 36
(2001).
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2. Stereotypes of Black Dangerousness,Culpability, and Criminality
Furthermore, psychological research at the intersection of race and crime has
consistently shown that whites perceive blacks as more dangerous, more crimeprone, and more blameworthy than whites. For instance, Sandra Graham and Brian
Lowery designed a study in which they read police officers and juvenile-justice
officials a fact pattern describing a shoplifting crime or an assault committed by a
hypothetical adolescent whose race was not specified. 1 ' For the experimental
group, the test subjects were subliminally exposed (i.e., exposed outside of the part
of their visual range that is consciously processed) to words associated with black
people. 1 4 The control group was subliminally exposed to words that have no
racial associations.1 15 As the researchers predicted, the racially primed group
judged the hypothetical adolescent as being more hostile, more adult-like and
blameworthy, more likely to possess internal criminal motivation, and more likely
to recidivate.1 6 Other similarly designed studies have yielded the same findings.117
One important psychological process that helps explain these results is the
fundamental attribution error." 8 When people evaluate their own negative behavior, or the undesirable actions of in-group members, they tend to excuse the
behavior by attributing it to external circumstances rather than to personal
character."' 9 By contrast, when evaluating other people, and particularly members
of an out-group, people tend to chalk up negative behavior to personality and to
downplay mitigating circumstances.12 0
Because race is still a salient part of the cognitive process of in-grouping and
out-grouping in contemporary America, 2 1 whites are prone to interpret "bad
behavior by blacks as stemming from some fundamental flaw in their nature, from
an irredeemably unworthy core rather than from an unfortunate situation." 2 2 In
other words, the instinct of many white Americans is to do exactly the opposite of

113. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent
Offenders, 28 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 490 (2004) (introducing the study's use of "crime reports").
114. See id. at 489 (discussing the study's use of "priming manipulations," which flashed "prime words," such
as "Harlem, homeboy, dreadlocks, [and] basketball," on a screen for 150 milliseconds each).
115. See id. at 489-90 (discussing the use of race-neutral words such as "heaven, kindness, devil, [and]
loneliness" in the "priming manipulations" performed with the control group).
116. See id. at 493 (summarizing results of the study).
117. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice:TheirAutomatic and ControlledComponents, 56
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 8-12 (1989) (detailing earlier studies).
118. See generally LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBEf, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (describing the fundamental attribution error).
119. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the FundamentalAttribution Error, 48
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 227 (1985) (explaining the role of bias in fundamental attribution error theory).
120. See, e.g., id.
121. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 106, at 1796 (discussing the prevalence of race-based in-grouping and
out-grouping).
122. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 19, at 418.
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what I suggested should be done in the previous Section.12 3 Rather than evaluating
the culpability of black criminals within the social context of segregation and
white privilege, for which we are collectively responsible, the fundamental
attribution error leads Americans to interpret black criminal behavior as an
ineradicable stain on the character of black individuals and communities.
White Americans also tend to perceive threats and anger in the ambiguous
actions of black individuals, but not in similar actions by white people. One study
showed test subjects a number of black and white faces that were emotionally
ambiguous: they could be reasonably interpreted as angry, but could also be
interpreted in other ways. 1 24 The study concluded that participants with high levels
of implicit racial bias more readily detected anger in the black faces than in highly
similar white faces.' 2 5 The result has been confirmed in other studies.12 6 In another
striking experiment, test subjects played a video game in which they were
supposed to shoot and kill armed criminals, but not innocent bystanders or fellow
police officers.12 7 When confronted with ambiguous-looking white and black
individuals who could not be clearly classified as criminal or innocent, participants
were substantially more likely to shoot the black characters than the white ones.12 8
The tendency of whites to over-detect threats and anger in situations involving
blacks helps explain why police officers often treat blacks as dangerous individuals who must be subdued with force.' 29 The undue harshness of law enforcement
toward blacks further reinforces the powerful sense of distrust, betrayal, and anger
that many blacks feel toward the police.1 30 The result is a vicious cycle of mutual
wariness, aggression, and escalation between black communities and law enforcement.

123. See supra Part I.B.2 (suggesting the collectivization of responsibility for black criminality).
124. See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice:Implicit Prejudice and the Perception
of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. 640, 642 (2003) (employing a facial emotion change-detection task to
determine whether racial prejudice biases people's perceptions of other's facial emotions).
125. See id. at 643 (summarizing results of the study).
126. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts
Amygdala Activation, 12 J. CoGNTmvE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730-34 (2000) (detailing results of similar racial bias
studies).
127. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination:Effects of Race on Responses to Weapon
Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCHoL. 399, 399 (2003) ("Rapid actions to persons holding weapons were
simulated using desktop virtual reality... . In one of two tasks Black males holding guns were police officers
while White males holding guns were criminals. In the other, Whites with guns were police and Blacks with guns
were criminals. In both tasks Blacks or Whites holding harmless objects were citizens.").
128. See id. at 403 ("[S]ubjects had greater difficulty distinguishing weapons from harmless objects when the
weapons were in the hands of simulated Blacks than Whites and . .. subjects were response-biased in the sense of
giving the weapon-appropriate response more readily to Black than to White targets.").
129. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to DisambiguatePotentially
Threatening Individuals,83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1314-15 (2002) (discussing studies showing
similar behavior to be considered more threatening when subject is black).
130. See Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explainingthe GreatRacial Divide: Perceptionsof Fairnessin the U.S.
Criminal Justice System, 67 AM. J. POL. ScI. 762, 763 (2005) (noting that most black Americans do not consider
the criminal justice system to be fair, while most white Americans do).
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In addition to negative stereotypes of blacks as a racial group, psychologists
have also identified bias relating to two characteristics that are related to, but
distinct from, race: bias based on skin color, and stereotypes based on Afrocentric
physical features.' 1 Although research in these areas is less developed than it is
for race, existing studies suggest that black people with darker skin color and
Afrocentric features are evaluated as being less virtuous and more crime-prone
than those with lighter skin and non-African features. 13 2 The result is that such
individuals are given longer prison sentences' 3 3 and also have a much higher risk
of receiving the death penalty.13 4
Racial stereotypes influence not only the severity of the sentence, but also the
evaluation of factual evidence of guilt or innocence. For instance, one study asked
test subjects to review evidence of a crime, including both incriminating and
exculpatory evidence, and assess the suspect's guilt.135 Participants who were told
that the suspect was a racial minority were better able to recall the incriminating
evidence against him, and less able to recall evidence tending to prove the suspect
not guilty. 13 6 These findings strongly suggest that a confirmation bias is at work,1 37
in which the test subjects who know the defendant is a racial minority initially
presume his or her guilt, and subsequently process and remember only the
evidence that confirms the original impression, forgetting the rest.13 8

131. Most studies of race and crime evaluate "race" as the independent variable. Race is a social construction
that is related to skin color, but not reducible to it. See Gotanda,supra note 33, at 23. With few exceptions (such as
the category "mulatto"), the white/black racial divide is socially constructed as binary: regardless of how light or
dark a person's skin is along a spectrum from light to dark, or how much a person's features resemble those that
are typical of Africans, the American conception of race categorizes that person as either white, black, or biracial.
See id. at 23-25 (describing the social "rules" that consider anyone with visible Black-African ancestry to be
black and anyone of mixed race to be "mulatto"). Thus, studies that focus on "race" can obscure shades of
difference within the categories of skin color and Afrocentricity.
132. See, e.g., S. PETERSON-LEWIS, EVALUATING THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER: THE EFFECTS OF OFFENDERS'
Socio-EcONOMIC STATUS, ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND COLOR ON PERSONALITY (1983) (addressing skin color);

Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence ofAfrocentric FacialFeaturesin Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 674,
678 (2004) (arguing that the association between Afrocentric features and stereotypic traits leads judges to
associate such features with heightened dangerousness and culpability).
133. See Blair et al., supra note 132, at 676-77 ("Afrocentric features were a significant predictor of sentence
length over and above the effects of the other factors.").
134. Cf Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants
Predicts Capital-SentencingOutcomes, 17 PsYCHOL. Sci. 383, 385 (2006) ("[D]efendants who were perceived to
be more stereotypically Black were more likely to be sentenced to death only when their victims were White.").
135. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing Process
Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 726, 728-29 (1988) (assessing whether
information-processing mechanisms contribute to judgmental discrimination in a mock juror decision-making
task).
136. See id. at 734 (summarizing results of the study).
137. See generally Peter C. Wason, On the Failureto Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q. J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129 (1960) (describing confirmation bias).
138. Bodenhausen, supranote 135, at 734.
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3. Racial Hostility and the Substantive CriminalLaw
Color-blind criminology frames the search for racism within the criminal-justice
system in terms of the question: do blacks commit more crime, as defined under
existing law, or is there discrimination against blacks? 3 9 However, psychological
research has demonstrated that these binary options present a false choice because
unconscious race-related hostility and failures of cross-racial empathy help determine what counts as a crime and how heavily certain crimes get punished. Existing
legislative definitions of crime and punishment, therefore, cannot automatically be
presumed race neutral.
"Dozens of studies . . . have found that white Americans' political preferences

are shaped by predispositions that characterize African Americans as lazy, welfaredependent, violent, or demanding special favors."' 4 0 One study found that viewing
a news segment involving a black crime suspect significantly increased white
experimental subjects' support for punitive criminal-justice policies; by contrast,
when the news segment featured a white criminal suspect, the viewers' support for
punitive policies did not increase. 14' Another study has shown that among white
test subjects, negative racial stereotypes closely correlate with support for punitive
crime-control policies.14 2 Many other studies have reached similar results using a
wide variety of different research approaches,14 3 lending credence to Michael
Tonry's pithy observation that in the escalating tough-on-crime politics of the last
several decades, "[t]he text may be crime," but "[t]he subtext is race."'4
D. PoliticalConsciousness:InstitutionalRacism and the
Consequences ofMass Incarceration
1. InstitutionalRacism: Shifting the Spotlightfrom White Intentions to Black
Consequences
The last Section concluded by showing that the political views of whites about
the seemingly race-neutral processes of defining crime and calibrating punishment
are shaped in part by subconscious hostility and indifference to blacks. Because
whites generally still control the levers of power in American society, most of the
criminal laws and punishments that are imposed upon black individuals and
communities are devised by people who harbor subconscious attitudes of hostility
139. See supraPart I.A.1.
140. Tali Mendelberg, Racial PrimingRevived, 6 PERSP. ON PoLS. 109, 109 (2008).
141. See Franklin D. Gilliam & Shanto lyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence ofLocal Television News on the
Viewing Public,44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 567-68 (2000) (summarizing results of a study evaluating the effects of
crime script on crime attitudes).
142. See Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public PerceptionsofRace and Crime: The Role ofRacialStereotypes,
41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 375, 393 (1997) (finding a strong relationship between whites' images of blacks and
judgments of crime and punishment, but only for black criminals who commit violent crimes).
143. See Mendelberg, supranote 140 (reviewing relevant literature).
144. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr. RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 6 (1995).
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and lack of empathy toward them. Consequently, the outcomes of majoritarian
political processes reflect what Lani Guinier has referred to as "legislative racism":
"a pattern of actions [that] persistently disadvantag[e] a fixed, legislative minority
as well as marginalization that results from
and encompass[] conscious exclusion
1 45
empathy."'
interracial
of
lack
'a
In the criminal-law context, the costs to the black community of not having their
voices adequately heard within democratic processes have been crushing. When
democracy functions properly, laws change when they become vastly more
harmful than helpful to their constituents.14 6 However, under conditions of
institutional racism,14 7 legislatures and other institutions of power are slow to
respond to the needs of minority communities. Thus, in identifying and combating
racism within the criminal-justice system, we should look not only to the
superficial race-neutrality of laws and the discoverable intentions of lawmakers,
but also to the consequences of law for minority communities.148
This Section examines the vast costs that mass incarceration imposes on poor
black communities and argues that these consequences should be taken into
account in judging the racial justice of the substantive criminal law. Determining
which areas of the substantive criminal law require intervention, and how
prosecutors should take account of consequences, is a complex matter that will be
discussed in more detail in later parts of the Article.
2. Grappling with the Costs of Mass Incarceration
Prison imposes severe costs on prisoners, their families, and their communities,
and "[n]owhere are these effects more highlighted than in the African American
community."149The already-enormous costs of imprisonment on communities are
exacerbated by the spatial density of incarceration: "the exit and reentry of inmates
is geographically concentrated in the poorest, minority neighborhoods." 5 0 In

145. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Questfor PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1444 (1991).
146. For one of the leading analyses of the ideal conditions for majoritarian politics, see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw chs. 4-6 (1980).
147. Institutional racism is related to, but conceptually distinct from, both conscious racism and unconscious
racism, because it completely shifts the spotlight away from the mental perspective of whites, and instead defines
racism in terms of the lived experience of oppression and inequality for racial minorities. "The key issue is result,
not intent." D. Georges-Abeyie, Criminal Justice Pmcessing of Non-White Minorities, in RACISM, EMPIRICISM
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 (B.D. MacLean & D. Milovanovic eds., 1990). One source helpfully explains that
institutional racism is present where "the social, political, economic, religious, and educational structures, or the
major institutions in a society benefit a particular race-the 'white' race in the United States-at the expense of
other races." MANN, supranote 3, at 21.
148. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Costs of Mass Incarcerationin African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1276 (2004) [hereinafter Roberts, Social andMoral Costs].
149. Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT- THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 2 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT].

150. Roberts, Social and Moral Costs,supra note 148, at 1276.
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some of these minority neighborhoods, as many as twenty-five percent of the adult
male residents are locked up on any given day." 1 These extraordinary imprisonment rates shatter the institutions that traditionally lend stability and controlmarriage, employment, civic engagement, etc.-in these communities to such an
extent that additional incarceration may be producing more crime, not less. 1 5 2
The most immediate harm of imprisonment is to the prisoner and his or her
family, friends, and romantic relationships. Prison disrupts the intimacy and
everyday connections between the prisoner and his or her loved ones, and it
imposes serious obstacles for their ongoing relationships.1 53 It makes prisoners
less marriageable and increases the risk of divorce for prisoners with existing
marriages.1 54 It vastly diminishes a prisoner's future employment prospects, 5 5
placing enormous strains on his or her family even after his or her release.
Imprisonment deprives prisoners' children of a parent (occasionally both
parents) and provides those children with an early and intimate connection with the
prison system; unsurprisingly, the children of incarcerated parents are much more
likely than other children to become involved in criminal activity.15 6 This is a
serious problem considering that, according to a 1999 study, 7.0% of black
children and 2.6% of Hispanic children (compared to 0.8% of white children) had
a parent in prison.' 5 7 The net effect of these and other factors devastates the lives
of prisoners and their families.' 5 8
The negative consequences of imprisonment reverberate throughout the prisoner's neighborhood and city communities-particularly in communities with high
incarceration rates. Mass imprisonment disrupts the already-fragile social networks and human capital of poor communities.' 5 9 Rather than rehabilitating
prisoners, modem incarceration tends to make prisoners more violent, antisocial,
and prone to criminality: "Most who study prison life believe there are significant
brutalizing effects to imprisonment that impair prisoners' inclinations to conform

151. See Todd R. Clear, The Problem with "Addition by Subtraction": The Prison-Crime Relationship in
Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 149, at 184 (providing incarceration statistics).

152. See Roberts, Social and Moral Costs, supra note 148, at 1297 ("Incarceration is no longer simply an
outcome of neighborhood crime, but is integrated in the damaged social fabric of communities that produces
crime.").
153. See WESTERN, supra note 4, at 136 (discussing familial relationships and the hardships imposed by
incarceration).
154. See id. ("Survey data show that imprisonment further reduces the marriage prospects of poor and minority
single men. Marriages interrupted by incarceration are unlikely to survive.").
155. See id. at 129 (discussing diminished employment prospects, including the aggregate earnings penalty).
156. Cf Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The Paradox of
Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIo ST. J. CluM. L. 173, 206 (2008) ("[T]hese children face a very high
risk of future criminal involvement.").
157. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STArsTIcs, INCARCERATED PARENTS
AND THEIR CHILDREN 2 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.

158. See generally John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, CollateralConsequences of Imprisonmentfor Children,
Communities, and Prisoners,26 CRIME & JUST. 121 (1999) (describing the collateral effects of imprisonment).
159. See Fagan & Meares, supra note 156, at 210 (discussing the effects of imprisonment on communities).
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to the law."' 6 The predictable results are a high rate of recidivism when prisoners
are released back into the community, 1 6 1 and thus, a rapid cycle of imprisonment
and release that continues to disrupt the fabric of the community.
Furthermore, communities coping with high levels of incarceration often have
less respect for the law and for social norms of law-abidingness, in large part
because they view themselves as victims of a discriminatory and unduly harsh
criminal-justice system. 162 In many poor, minority communities, the incarceration
of adolescents and young men is so common that it has become an expected "rite

of passage."

63

In response to the normalization of imprisonment, an entire culture has
emerged-a culture that is strongly reflected in hip-hop media-that promotes
social norms that challenge those embodied in the criminal law.164 These sources
stigmatize the government (especially the police) for inflicting imprisonment,
rather than stigmatizing criminals for being imprisoned.16 5 Under these conditions,
the criminal law ceases to command respect from communities faced with mass
imprisonment, and instead becomes a source of alienation, resentment, and civic
isolation.
Furthermore, felon-disenfranchisement laws ensure that communities with large
convict populations lose much of their voting potential. Every state except Maine
and Vermont prohibits felons from voting during their term of incarceration, and
most states extend the prohibition beyond incarceration to cover parole and
probation as well; a handful of states continue to disenfranchise some or all felons
even after they complete their sentences.' 6 6 As a result of racially disproportionate
rates of incarceration, felon-disenfranchisement laws disproportionately deprive
black people of the right to vote. Across almost the entire nation, five percent or

160. Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social
DisorganizationTheory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441, 465 (1998).

161. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based
Practiceto State Sentencing Practiceand Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 585, 591-93 (2009) (detailing high rates of
recidivism due to over-reliance on imprisonment and lack of efforts to rehabilitate offenders).
162. See Fagan & Meares, supra note 156, at 214-15, 219-20 (discussing the undermining effects of
stigmatization and discrimination on community perceptions of fairness within the criminal-justice system).
163. Jerome Miller, Bringing the Individual Back in: A Commentary on Wacquant and Anderson, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 142 (David Garland ed., 2001).
164. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 130-33 (2009) (discussing
the emergence of this hip-hop culture).
165. See id at 130-33.
166. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia disallow felons from voting during their term of
incarceration; thirty-five states disallow voting by felons during their prison and parole terms; thirty states
disallow felon voting during probation; two states (Kentucky and Virginia) presumptively disenfranchise all
felons even after they have completed their sentences, whereas nine other states do so only for felons who
committed certain types of offenses. SENTENCING PRojEcr, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED

STATES 1, 3 (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-bsfdlawsinus.pdf. These states allow
various processes by which felons can apply for restoration of their voting rights, but these processes are "so
cumbersome that few ex-offenders are able to take advantage of them." Id. at 1.
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more of the black voting-age population has been disenfranchised under these
laws; in fourteen states, the number is over ten percent, and in five states, it
exceeds twenty percent. 1 6 7 This political exclusion cripples the ability of many
poor, minority communities to have their voices heard by their elected representatives'66 and to protect themselves against (among other things) the harsh laws that
produced widespread felony convictions and disenfranchisement in the first
instance.
Finally, the disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities tends to reproduce itself by validating and intensifying the conscious and unconscious racist
attitudes that help create disparate criminal-justice outcomes. Racially disproportionate imprisonment, whatever its cause, has the effect of confirming and
legitimizing these attitudes.' 69 It seems to statistically "prove" that blacks and
other minorities are dangerous, and it therefore fuels the so-called "rational
discrimination" that is praised and practiced by numerous scholars, news sources,
police officers, and others who claim that associating blackness with danger and
crime is statistically rational and, therefore, morally justified.170
These reinforced biases, in turn, generate and legitimize the next generation of
racially biased policing, prosecution, adjudication, and legislation. Even outside
the criminal-justice system, these biases ensure that blacks will have to endure a
vast range of humiliations and disadvantages: the suspicions and stereotypes of
ordinary people on the street, potential employers, mortgage lenders, fearful cab
drivers, and numerous other indignities.' 7 ' This "Black Tax" is especially crippling for economically disadvantaged blacks, but to a large extent it is shared by all
blacks: both the innocent and the guilty.17 2

167. See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED Ourr FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 79-80 (2006) (providing disenfranchisement statistics).

168. In fact, Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza have convincingly shown that felon-disenfranchisement laws
determined the outcome of the 2000 election. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction?:
PoliticalConsequencesof Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777,792-93 (2002).
According to projections, if felons were permitted to vote, Al Gore would have received an additional 60,000
votes in Florida, which would have sufficed to win Florida and the overall election. See id.
169. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of
Distinction", 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2561 (1995) ("Criminal law enforcement is expressly designed to have a
stigmatic effect .. .. The criminal justice system's stigma is not expressly race-based . . .. But when the results of
the criminal justice system are as racially disproportionate as they are today, the criminal stigma extends beyond
the particular behaviors and individuals involved, to reach all young black men, and to a lesser extent all black
people.").
170. For one of the leading defenses of "rational discrimination" against blacks, see DINESH D'SOuzA, THE
END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 285 (1995).
17 1. See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GUrT THE ARREST OF HENRY Louis GATES, JR.
AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA, at epilogue (2010) (providing 100 vivid stories of black individuals
being held in suspicion in a wide variety of social contexts).
172. See ARMOUR, supra note 76, at 13-17 (discussing the so-called Black Tax).
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3. CollateralBenefits of Law Enforcementfor Black Communities
It is important to acknowledge an important fact that adds balance to the prior
discussion. Blacks may suffer the most from mass imprisonment, but they also
reap a disproportionate share of its benefits. Most interpersonal crime committed
by blacks has a black victim, 17 3 and the social damage of nonviolent crimes
committed by blacks, such as drug possession and distribution, is likely to be felt
most acutely by other blacks.
Thus, insofar as crime-control policies succeed in deterring crime and protecting victims, black individuals and communities stand to benefit from those results.
It is an exaggeration to conclude, as some scholars have, that "the main problem
confronting black communities in the United States is not excessive policing and
invidious punishment but rather a failure of the state to provide black communities
with the equal protection of the laws."174 However, we must bear in mind that
incarceration-including the incarceration of blacks-brings both benefits and
costs to black communities, and the ratio of benefits to costs varies depending on
the situation. Solutions to mass incarceration must be based on a nuanced and
context-sensitive consideration of costs and benefits of various criminal laws and
law-enforcement strategies, rather than a reflexive aversion to (or promotion of)
the enforcement of the criminal law.
II.

COLOR-CONSCIOUS PROSECUTION

The last Part outlined a tragic cycle of race-related disadvantage, crime,
unconscious racism, and imprisonment that will continue and potentially worsen
unless crucial actors-black communities, prosecutors, police, jurors, legislators,
voters, and others-in the criminal-justice system challenge the pattern. The point
is not to promote despair, but to lay the groundwork for progress and healing. This
Part explores a variety of ways that one important set of actors-criminal
prosecutors-can become a positive force for change by confronting bias in
themselves and others, and also by coming to grips with the crippling social
consequences of mass imprisonment. In doing so, I also aim to explain why
color-conscious prosecuting is justified as a matter of professional ethics.
It might initially seem that the second conclusion follows inexorably from the
first, but it does not. Even if prosecutors are capable of contributing to racial
fairness in the criminal-justice system by their actions, there is still a case to be
made that color consciousness-particularly color consciousness that redounds
to the benefit of criminal defendants-violates the professional obligations of

173. See, e.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Question of Black Crime, 117 Pus. INT. 3, 3 (1994).
174. Randall Kennedy, The State, CriminalLaw, and Racial Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1255, 1256 (1994). For a powerful criticism of Professor Kennedy's position, see Cole, supranote 169.
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prosecutors as articulated in the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
ProfessionalResponsibility (and corresponding state rules). This counterargument
rests on the premise that the American legal system is an adversarial one in which
the lawyers of each side ought to zealously present the strongest version of their
client's case, and leave it to the judge and jury to determine which side is
correct.' 7 5 The goal of this Part is not to wage general war on the adversarial
system, but instead to advance a context-specific argument that prosecutors should
adopt a non-adversarial, justice-seeking approach when addressing the racial
dimensions of their cases.
In many areas of their work, prosecutors already make important contributions
to racial justice, and it is important to acknowledge these efforts in order to present
a balanced narrative. Prosecutors are responsible for enforcing hate-crime laws.
They routinely interact with black witnesses, vindicate the dignity of black crime
victims, and protect many predominantly black communities from the scourge of
crime.17 6 After many dark years of governmental indifference to criminal acts with
a black victim, 17 7 these are no small accomplishments.
Those developments have been extensively documented and analyzed by other
scholars and embraced by many prosecutors, perhaps because they are the
dimensions of color consciousness that are consistent with an adversarial conception of the prosecutor's role.' 78 Consequently, I will focus primarily on the less
discussed yet equally important non-adversarial aspects of color-conscious prosecution-the ways in which prosecutors can help promote racial justice for black
defendants, and not just for black victims.
One more caveat is appropriate at this juncture. I recognize that individual
prosecutors do not call all of their own shots regarding how to properly exercise
discretion. They must consider not only their own personal conception of justice,
but also the culture and policies of the office in which they work. A few of my
recommendations will be difficult, or even impossible, for some prosecutors to
implement within their institutional environments; others may find their institutions more accepting, and even encouraging, of interventions in the service of
racial fairness. In order to do justice to the complex institutional constraints that
individual prosecutors are faced with, I will temporarily set those issues aside in
this Part and provide them with comprehensive treatment in the next Part.

175. See generally infra Part II.A (describing the nature of the American adversarial system).
176. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 73 (praising vigorous law enforcement in black communities for
ending a legacy of indifference to black-on-black crime).
177. See id.
178. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2242-43 (2001)
(explaining why color consciousness resonates with traditional conceptions of a prosecutor's ethical duties in
cases involving racially motivated violence).
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A. The AdversarialSystem and the Prosecutor'sDual Role
Within America's adversarial legal system, the "standard conception of the
lawyer's role" consists primarily of two principles: neutrality and partisanship. 7 9
The principle of neutrality requires the lawyer to divorce his or her ethical and
political beliefs from his or her legal service, and instead to adopt the goals and
perspective of the client. 80 The principle of partisanship states that the lawyer
must energetically pursue the interests of his or her client, even to the detriment of
others.' 8 ' According to these standards of professional ethics, the principal duty of
most American lawyers is to seek an outcome favorable to his or her client, not to
seek outcomes that are also fair to the opposing party or to third parties who are
uninvolved in the adversarial showdown. 18 2
Despite the centrality of the principles of neutrality and partisanship in the
American conception of the lawyer's role, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct recognize countervailing principles in certain contexts as well. For
instance, lawyers may not obstruct an opposing party's access to evidence, 8 3
deceive the Court,' 84 or bypass counsel by communicating directly with represented opposing parties.' 8 5 Lawyers are expected to be civil' 86 and to conduct
themselves as "officer[s] of the legal system."' 8 7 Although American lawyers
frequently push the envelope on, and even transgress, these and other nonadversarial requirements in the course of zealously representing their clients, it is
worth noting that the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct do not dictate a purely
adversarial role for lawyers.' 88 Instead, they supply a multivalent set of principles
that can often come into tension with one another, demanding that lawyers
creatively navigate through the resulting conflicts.1 8 9

179. Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.YU. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Lord Henry Brougham famously (or infamously, depending on perspective) described the absolute
partisan loyalty that a lawyer must show to his or her client in the following way:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is
his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
2 THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY, CAROLINE AMELIA ELIZABETH, QUEEN OF ENGLAND 2

(John Fairbum ed., 1820).
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2010).

184. Id. at R. 3.3.
185. Id. at R. 4.2.
186. Id. at Preamble 19.
187. Id. at Preamble 1.

188. See William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1133 (1988).
189. See generally id. ("Regardless of what the 'adversary system' means, it does not adequately describe the
relevant aspects of the American tradition of advocacy. In that tradition, the lawyer has been both an advocate and
an 'officer of the court' with responsibilities to third parties, the public, and the law. There has never been a
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The non-adversarial dimension of a prosecutor's professional ethics is broader
and more well-defined than that of other lawyers. Prosecutors have a "dual role" to
serve both as advocates for the government within an adversarial system, and also
as "officers of justice."' 9 0 Their obligation is to "'seek justice, not merely to
convict."" 9 ' Nonetheless, due to the ambiguous meaning of the prosecutor's duty
to seek "justice" and the internal dissonance within the prosecutor's "dual role,"
there are many conflicting views about how a prosecutor should reconcile these
competing obligations.1 9 2 The weight that a prosecutor should give to each part of
his or her professional duty in any particular setting is not pre-ordained, and the
prosecutor must frequently make judgments about the strength of the justifications
for (and objections to) adversarialism in various situations. 93 These assessments
are necessarily context sensitive, because the adversarial norm is valuable in some
situations and destructive in others.19 4
Normative scholarship about the adversarial system is vast, and it is neither
viable nor necessary to provide a comprehensive summary of it here. Three
portions of the debate over adversarial lawyering are relevant to the upcoming
discussion of color-conscious prosecution. The first dispute addresses whether
adversarial legal norms advance or degrade human dignity. Proponents of adversarialism contend that it safeguards dignity by valuing the client's autonomy' 9 5
and embodying the virtues of loyalty and friendship. 19 6 Detractors counter that
partisanship degrades the dignity of opposing parties and fosters alienation instead
of dignity-enhancing reconciliation between adversaries.' 9 7
The second area of controversy is whether adversarial norms provide the best
way to discern truth. Proponents of adversarial legal practice contend that vigorous
and partisan presentation of both sides of an issue is the best way to arrive at truth,
because it ensures that no stone is left unturned, and it encourages creative

consensus about where to draw the line between these two aspects of the lawyer's role, and the two have always
been in tension within the professional culture.").
190. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 31, at 356-575.
191. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987) (quoting MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1982)).

192. See Fred Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,
44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) ("The 'do justice' standard ... establishes no identifiable norm. Its vagueness

leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct. Some will decide that
justice lies in conviction at all cost; others will bend over backwards to vindicate defendants' rights . . .
(footnotes omitted)).
193. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'

ETmics 83 (1983) (arguing that the justifications for and against the adversarial norm are inconclusive and context
sensitive).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETmics (3d ed. 2004).

196. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:The MoralFoundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
197. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE To DIALOGUE (1998).
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advocacy on behalf of unpopular truths that might otherwise go overlooked. 19 8
Detractors counter that aggressive partisanship leads to deceptive advocacy,
secrecy, and sensationalistic diversions calculated to undermine the quest for
truth.199

Finally, there is an additional argument for neutral partisanship-based on
majoritarian political theory-that is unique to prosecutors. 2 " Some scholars take
the position that prosecutors should generally charge whatever statutory crimes
apply to a defendant's actions in order to give full effect to the political values
reflected in legislation which, in turn, are the values of the legislators and the
people who elected them.2 0 '
The remainder of this Part will explain why prosecutors should embrace a
color-conscious and non-adversarial norm in relation to the racial issues that are
implicated in their cases. The following Sections provide concrete examples of
some of the most significant and recurrent racial issues, such as profiling and
discriminatory jury selection. I will show that a color-conscious, justice-seeking
approach in these areas promotes human dignity, furthers the quest for truth, and
advances the worthy political value of protecting minorities who are at risk of
oppression at the hands of a hostile majority. Thus, prosecutors should emphasize
the justice-seeking component of their "dual role" 202 over the adversarial component when their cases involve issues of race.
B. ConfrontingImplicit Racial Bias in DiscretionaryDecision-Making
As I explained in Part I, racism does not ordinarily manifest itself in deliberate
choices or easily detectable racial hostility. Rather, it most often takes the form of
implicit bias and stereotypes that negatively influence the way Americans subconsciously evaluate blacks. The same is true of prosecutors. Gone are the days when
a prosecutor could ask the jury, "[a]re you gentlemen going to believe that nigger
sitting over there (pointing at the defendant), with a face on him like that, in
preference to the testimony of [white] deputies?" 20 3

198. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SmrrH, supra note 195.
199. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
200. Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutorsas Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1413 (2010).
201. In fact, the Western European model of prosecution provides less discretion as a way to promote
democratic accountability:
Despite their quasi-judicial role and independence, prosecutors are held accountable through a
hierarchical system and series of guidelines .... It is widely believed that the lack of such
measures would leave prosecutors free to interpret the needs of justice as they alone see fit,
regardless of the democratically supported goals of government. No less than undue political
meddling in individual cases, a free-wheeling prosecution would be perceived as undermining the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
Id. at 1469.
202. RHODE & LuBAN, supranote 31, at 355.
203. James v. State, 92 So. 909, 909 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922).
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Today, the most important way in which prosecutors contribute to racial
injustice-or promote racial justice-lies in their discretionary decisions before
and after trial: whether to indict or dismiss charges, whether to offer a generous
plea agreement, and which sentence to recommend for a convicted defendant. In
many prosecutorial offices around the country, these judgments are not governed
by rigid guidelines. Due to the wide discretion entrusted to prosecutors in these
crucial areas, many commentators consider them to be the "most powerful
figure[s] in the administration of criminal justice." 20 Defense attorneys have no
comparable power: their role consists largely in awaiting the prosecutor's decision
and reacting to it. 2 05
Prosecutorial discretion is full of both peril and promise. When burdened by
unrecognized racial bias, a prosecutor's discretion will be guided by factual
misperceptions and an unjustified propensity for retribution in cases involving
black defendants. However, when liberated by color consciousness, discretion
contains the potential not only to be fair and non-discriminatory, but even to
affirmatively advance the dignity and social position of blacks who are under
attack by racial profiling and unjust laws. This Section explains why discretionary
decision-making is susceptible to implicit racial bias and how prosecutors can
confront their own stereotypes so as to improve the quality of the justice they
deliver. The next Section will show how color-conscious prosecutors can utilize
their discretion to actively promote racial equity.
1. The Perils of ProsecutorialDiscretion
Studies investigating cognitive bias have consistently shown that discretionary
decisions without clear guidelines present the highest risk of racial bias.2 06 When
the proper course of action is definite and obvious, deviations are typically the
result of conscious mental processes. Because racial discrimination is rarely based
on deliberate hostility in contemporary America, it is less likely to come into play

204. Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial
DecisionMaking, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473, 477 (1976). I, like some others, rank the police-who also exercise
an impressive amount of discretion at crucial junctures in the criminal-justice process-as being at least as
important as prosecutors. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the
Criminal System, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 965, 968 (2008) ("Functionally speaking, ... the investigative sphere is
the most powerful adjudicative arena, in which police and prosecutorial decisions about information and potential
liability determine the circumstances under which individuals must confront the coercive powers of the state."). In
fact, one of the most important ways that prosecutors can contribute to racial justice is by using their discretion to
counteract racial profiling by the police and by encouraging police officers to exercise their own discretion in
racially equitable ways. See infra Part I.C. 1-2.
205. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the CapitalPenalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 273, 287 (1991).

206. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and
1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Scl. 315, 317 (2000) (presenting one such study).
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when the parameters of a situation are well-defined.20 7 By contrast, when judgments are to be made on the basis of undefined criteria and subjective assessments,
there is more room for racial bias to drive the decision-making process.20 8
Prosecutors and police are constantly called upon to make judgments that
involve unstable and contested criteria. Before police may arrest a suspect, they are
constitutionally required to have "probable cause" to believe that the suspect is
guilty of a crime. 2 0 9 Thus, even when an officer believes a crime has been
committed, the officer must use his or her discretion to determine-based on
largely undefined factors-whether the crime is a serious enough matter to justify
an arrest, or whether a slap on the wrist will suffice.
Similarly, prosecutors must dismiss charges when they believe that the police
lacked probable cause to justify the arrest.2 10 However, they may also dismiss a
case for other, less tangible reasons, such as a strategic assessment that the jury is
not likely to find the defendant guilty, or a moral judgment that the defendant
deserves a break.2 1 1 If a prosecutor views the defendant as a dangerous person who
is likely to flee or commit additional crimes prior to trial, he or she may request that
the court detain the person until trial; otherwise, the prosecutor may consent to
pretrial release.2 12 Prosecutors make similar judgments regarding the defendant's
factual guilt, dangerousness, and moral culpability in determining which plea
agreement (if any) to offer, which charges to pursue, and which sentence to
recommend to the judge or jury at the end of trial.2 13
Some cases involve facts that make the correct course of action fairly obvious,
largely removing the discretionary element from the decision. For instance, when
the facts strongly suggest the guilt of a defendant charged with a serious violent
crime, it is not difficult to conclude that the defendant is dangerous and therefore
should not be released prior to trial. These circumstances do not provide much
room for implicit bias to influence outcomes.

207. See, e.g., Gordon Hodson et al., Processesin Racial Discrimination:Differential Weighting of Conflicting
Information, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 461 (2002).

208. Id. at 469.
209. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("'The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . ."). See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing the probable-cause
requirement for making an arrest).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8(a) (2010).

211. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("In the ordinary case, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (2006) (laying out the standards for detaining defendants before trial on the
basis of flight risk and dangerousness to community).
213. See generally Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 259, 266-74 (2001)
(discussing prosecutors' discretion in making plea agreements, bringing charges, and recommending sentencing).
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However, most cases are less clear cut: there may be unresolved questions
regarding whether the evidence points toward the defendant's guilt, or, even if the
defendant is guilty, it is often debatable whether he or she is a danger to society,
capable of rehabilitation, or morally deserving of a long prison sentence. These
ambiguities present a serious risk that the stereotypes described in the last
Part-that blacks are angry, dangerous, culpable, and criminal-may adversely
shape the prosecutor's subjective evaluation of the defendant, resulting in harsher
discretionary treatment. 214
None of the justifications in favor of adversarial lawyering introduced in the last
Section-promoting human dignity, democratic values, or the quest for truth--can
justify passivity in the face of potentially outcome-determining racial stereotypes.
Nor can color-conscious advocacy by defense counsel compensate for the misguided exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It is for the prosecutor to make the
fateful decisions about charging, plea bargaining, and influential sentencing
recommendations. 2 15 Defense counsel is left to react.21 6
2. Ameliorating Implicit Racial Bias in the Exercise of Discretion
There is no easy or complete solution to the problem of implicit bias, but
psychological research again charts the way forward. As I explained in the
previous Part, most Americans simultaneously embody three traits: (1) at the
conscious level, they oppose racism and want no part in it; (2) at the subconscious
level, they are beholden to racist stereotypes about blacks; and (3) they are in
denial about their subconscious racism.2 t Because these individuals are unaware
of their implicit biases, they are unable to mobilize their conscious egalitarian
beliefs as a counterweight to those biases.21 8
Prosecutors (and others) must give up on the color-blind strategy for combating
racism, which emphasizes repression and denial, and instead seek racial awareness. Racial awareness is multidimensional. It includes the various aspects of
historical, psychological, and political consciousness introduced in Part I. For
prosecutors, the first step toward color consciousness is to acknowledge and strive
to understand their own racial stereotypes about blacks, and to identify the

214. For a useful summary of a segment of the existing research on the influence of racial bias on prosecutorial
discretion, see Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution
Jurisprudenceand a Reform Proposal,19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 130, 130-33 (2003) ("[R]acial bias is present
in every stage of prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to investigate, the initial assessment of the
severity of the offense, the charging decision, and the decision whether to seek the death penalty in homicide
cases.").
215. See generally Griffin, supra note 213, at 266-74 (describing the prosecutor's discretion).
216. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 117, at 15 ("[C]ontrolled processes can inhibit the effects of automatic
processing [of racial stereotypes] when the implications of such processing compete with goals to establish or
maintain a nonprejudiced identity.").
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situations in which those biases are likely to influence their decision-making.
Wielding this knowledge would enable prosecutors to leverage their anti-racist
beliefs and consciously inhibit their stereotypes in situations where those stereotypes would ordinarily be activated.2 1 9
One high-impact way to acquire awareness about stereotypes is to take an
IAT,2 20 which provides a large volume of information for little or no cost: it is
simple, freely available online, and minimally time-consuming. 22 ' Whether or not
they decide to take an IAT, prosecutors should compare the way in which they
assess blacks and whites in a variety of everyday situations. When walking down a
city street at night, do they have the same reaction when approached by a group of
young white men as they do when approached by young black men? Similarly,
prosecutors should bring awareness-raising, de-biasing practices into their daily
work. One way prosecutors can do this is by mentally switching the defendant's
race and observing whether they would reach the same conclusion about whether
to dismiss charges, offer a generous plea, emphasize retribution or rehabilitation,
etc.222 De-biasing measures such as these are simple, non-burdensome, and
realistic. If implemented, they hold considerable promise for enhancing racial
fairness in prosecutorial decision-making.
C. Promoting Racial Equity Through the Exercise of Discretion
Color consciousness not only helps to diminish bias in prosecutorial decisionmaking, but it also provides ways for prosecutors to make affirmative contributions to racial justice. A prosecutor's interactions with police, charging decisions,
and sentencing recommendations all present opportunities to challenge racial
profiling.2 23 Furthermore, prosecutors can blunt the force of unjust criminal laws
by deciding not to seek indictments based on those laws, offering more equitable
plea arrangements based on other laws, or recommending sentences that are
commensurate with the true nature of the offense.2 24
Most of the commentators who are worried about racial unfairness in the
criminal-justice system are also deeply concerned about prosecutorial discretion,
in large part due to the reasons described in the last Section. 2 2 5 They may be

219. See id.
220. See supra Part I.C. 1 (introducing and discussing various IATs).
221. Harvard University, Washington University, and the University of Virginia operate a research website that
provides free and easy access to a variety of IATs, including the classic racial-bias IAT. See PROJECT IMPLIcIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
222. See, e.g., Capers, supranote 69, at 75 (recommending switching as a technique for ameliorating bias in
the exercise of discretion by police officers).
223. See infra Part I.C. 1-2.
224. See infra Part II.C.3.
225. See, e.g., Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalizationof Criminal Law: The Need for
Meaningful Judicial Review of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (1997) ("Given the
statistics regarding race and federal crack prosecutions, and more importantly the perceptions of racial bias that
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skeptical that discretion can be used as a positive force for racial justice. I do not
take a position on the highly controversial subject of whether prosecutorial
discretion is, on the whole, a good or a bad thing, or how it should be constrained.2 26 In our current system of criminal justice, the fact is that prosecutors
have discretion-more in some jurisdictions than others-and no major social or
political currents suggest that this reality will change in a meaningful way anytime
soon. 2 2 7 As long as prosecutors are authorized and expected to exercise discretion,
it is important to understand how they can employ that discretion in the service of
racial justice. This Section explores several concrete ways in which they can do so.
1. ChallengingRacial Profiling
As I explained in Part I, the profiling of suspects on the basis of race is an
explicit and accepted part of policing in some jurisdictions, and a deeply entrenched, implicit law-enforcement practice in others. Consequently, many more
innocent blacks are monitored, stopped, questioned, and harassed by police than
similarly situated innocent whites, and far more factually guilty blacks wind up
with criminal records for the same behaviors that whites routinely get away
with.228
Prosecutors are uniquely well-positioned to challenge these forms of racial
profiling. They work directly with arresting officers to build the case against a
criminal defendant, and, on occasion, they may begin coordinating with investigative officers before an arrest is made. These interactions enable prosecutors to
question officers about their reasons for investigating defendants and educate (or
remind) officers that racial profiling is not only morally unacceptable, but that it
may even jeopardize the government's ability to secure a conviction or, more
likely, expose the police department to civil litigation.22 9
Existing data suggests that certain types of cases-such as traffic infractions,2 30

stem from these statistics, nowhere is a careful reexamination of the prosecutorial discretion doctrine more
warranted than in the context of race-based selective prosecution claims." (footnote omitted)).
226. For a summary of various positions regarding the desirability of prosecutorial discretion and strategies for
regulating it, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating FederalProsecutors'Ethics,55 VAND. L. REV.
381 (2002).
227. In recent decades, the most significant movement among prosecutors has been community prosecution,
which in many respects enhances rather than diminishes prosecutorial discretion (in particular, the discretion to
choose between prison-based and rehabilitative sentences). See generally JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, CHERYL IRONSGuYNN & DORIS WEILAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES: MEASURING IMPAcr 2
(2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/192826.pdf (discussing the history of community prosecution and its
key dimensions). For a discussion of this movement, see infra Part II.B.3.
228. See supra Part I.B. 1.
229. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 CoLum. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 41, 60-81 (2001)
(summarizing the judiciary's treatment of various legal theories for challenging racial profiling).
230. See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Courtand
PretextualTraffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 560-76 (1997).
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minor public-order violations, 2 3 1 and drug possession and distribution 2 3 2 -are
especially likely to originate in racial profiling by law enforcement. Prosecutors
should carefully scrutinize the basis for the officer's suspicion and investigation in
cases falling within these categories.2 33 When the officer provides a flimsy ex ante
justification for investigating the defendant, and the prosecutor suspects that racial
bias may have been a consideration, he or she should directly ask the officer
whether race was the basis for the investigation. Even though it is unlikely that the
officer will directly admit to racial profiling, these interactions can serve as vital
teaching moments.
If it is clear that racial profiling took place, the prosecutor "may legitimately
decide to exercise her discretion to decline prosecution."2 34 In many situations, it
may not be possible or desirable to dismiss charges, even when the arrest was the
result of profiling. To use an extreme case, a prosecutor should not exercise his or
her discretion to dismiss murder or rape charges based on police misconduct:
everyone in society-white, black, and others-would be put at risk by such an
outcome. Each case is unique and multifaceted. Prosecutors must use their own
judgment in discerning which cases are appropriate to dismiss based on racial
profiling, versus those for which such a remedy is too drastic. However, a pure
adversarial approach that reflexively ignores or excuses racial profiling in all cases
perpetuates law-enforcement habits that degrade the dignity of blacks and further
impedes the full integration of American society.
2. Assessing the Weight of PriorCriminalHistory
Prosecutors can also help guard against segregationist policing in the way they
choose to evaluate and make use of prior criminal history. A defendant's criminal
record pervasively influences prosecutorial decision-making, because it can often
help predict the defendant's dangerousness to society and likelihood of recidivism.
Among the factors that help predict the likelihood of future violence and criminality, "no risk factor has been more thoroughly studied [than past violence and
criminality] and none have generated more reliable results."2 35 Thus, prosecutors
often consider criminal history in deciding which charges (if any) to bring, how
lenient of a plea agreement to offer, whether to seek statutory penalty enhance-

231. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 69, at 69-70.
232. See, e.g., Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control Policies
on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 23-29 (2008).
233. Cf Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IowA L. REV. 125, 165 (2008) (arguing for a
proactive approach in which prosecutors seek not only to eliminate their own racial biases, but also to "push back
against problems that originate outside the office").
234. Davis, Prosecution and Race, supra note 19, at 31.
235. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: ForecastingHarm Among Prisoners,Predators,
and Patients,92 VA. L. REv. 391, 423 (2006).
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ments (for instance, under "Three Strikes" laws) 2 3 6 and what sentence to recommend to the judge after a defendant is convicted.23 7 When permitted by the rules of
evidence, prosecutors frequently seek to disclose the defendant's prior crimes to
the jury in order to impeach the defendant's trial testimony or to provide
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.2 3 8
Like their peers, color-conscious prosecutors should consider a defendant's
prior record in appropriate situations. However, they should also strive to discern
which portions of the defendant's record truly reflect his or her actual criminal
propensity, and which parts are more likely to have resulted from the arresting
officers' racially charged criteria for deciding who is suspicious enough to
investigate.
Judge Nancy Gertner's sentencing decision in United States v. Leviner2
helpfully illustrates a color-conscious approach to prior criminal history. By way
of background, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") require judges to
mathematically factor all of a defendant's prior convictions into the initial
calculation of the defendant's recommended sentencing range, often called the
"Guidelines range." 240 The Guidelines do not dictate where within the Guidelines
range the ultimate sentence must fall; 2 4 1 instead, the sentencing judge may
authorize upward or downward departures from the Guidelines range when the
defendant's criminal-history category misstates the "seriousness of the defendant's

criminal history." 2 4 2
As she was required to do, Judge Gertner initially accounted for all of the
defendant's prior convictions in calculating the Guidelines range.2 43 However, she
authorized a downward departure from the recommended Guidelines range in part
because several of the defendant's prior convictions were for driving with a
suspended license. 2 " She referred to scholarship and news reports showing that
"[m]otor vehicle offenses, in particular, raise deep concerns about racial disparity,"
arguing that counting those offenses would "effectively replicate[] disparities in
sentencing" that had been introduced in the earlier criminal cases.2 45 Although she

236. See generally Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400-22 (1997) (describing the history and spread of Three Strikes laws in America).
237. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B (2011) (providing for sentencing based on criminal

history).
238. For a general discussion of when the rules of evidence permit the use of prior crimes evidence, see
Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38
EMORY L.J. 135 (1989).

239. 31 F Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998).
240. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 237, at

application instructions).
241. See generally id.
242. Id. at § 4A1.3(a)-(b).
243. Leviner, 31 F Supp. 2d at 31.
244. See id. at 32-33.
245. Id. at 33 (footnotes omitted).

§

11.1 (setting forth the Guidelines'
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acknowledged her lack of definitive proof that segregationist policing was behind
these particular prior convictions, she relied on statistical information about the
prevalence of racial profiling in the applicable crime categories to infer that
profiling partially explains the defendant's prior record.24 6
Color-conscious prosecutors should model several aspects of Judge Gertner's
analysis. They should rely on prior criminal history in appropriate situations and
abide by the rules-such as the Guidelines-that govern how criminal record
influences discretionary decision-making. However, where the applicable rules
leave room for discretion-as the Guidelines do in determining where a defendant
falls within the Guidelines range and whether a downward departure from the
range is justified 24 7-prosecutors should take into consideration the race of the
defendant, the crime categories reflected in the defendant's prior record, and the
statistical evidence of racial profiling within those crime categories. Attentiveness
to these factors can help prosecutors determine whether the defendant's prior
record reflects his or her actual dangerousness, or just his or her race.
Finally, even when a prosecutor concludes that race is reflected in the defendant's prior record, he or she must carefully assess whether it is justifiable to
discount the weight of criminal history on that basis. A criminal record involving
serious, violent crimes is not the appropriate place for prosecutors to stage their
color-conscious interventions, even when racial profiling may have prompted the
underlying investigations that gave rise to that criminal record. 2 4 8 Less dangerous
crimes, however, may provide promising opportunities for corrective action.
3. Discretion as Legal Reform
One of the most high-impact-but also complex and controversial-ways that
prosecutors can contribute to racial justice is by creatively using their discretion to
reshape the law according to the demands of racial justice. 2 4 9 As I discussed in Part
I, a pervasive problem with color-blind analyses of the criminal-justice system is
that they assume that the substantive criminal law is race neutral, and that the only
place where racism has room to maneuver is in the enforcement of the criminal
law: police and prosecutorial discretionary decisions, jury verdicts, sentencing
decisions, etc. 250 This assumption should be rejected because institutional racism
excludes minorities from democratic political processes and prevents the substan-

246. See id. ("While I can make no judgment about what happened specifically with Leviner's motor vehicle
charges, surely, the studies described above raise questions about what drew the officer's attention to Leviner in
the first place.").
247. See U.S. SENrENcI GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 237, at § IB1.1.
248. See Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 89, at 877-78 (explaining that affirmative action within the
criminal law should operate primarily within the realm of nonviolent crimes, not violent offenses).
249. See Podgor,supranote 19, at 474 ("Broad prosecutorial discretion provides prosecutors with the ability to
move beyond merely matching conduct with statutes. It allows prosecutors to correct bias within our legal
system.").
250. See supra Part I.C.3.

2012]

1581

REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

tive law from responding to minority voices or taking into account the suffering
that the law imposes upon them. 25 '
Consequently, prosecutors should not embrace a vision of their professional
duties that is grounded exclusively in majoritarian, democratic values. Under
conditions of institutional racism, some of the laws erected by the majority impose
vast burdens on minority communities that are not commensurate with their
benefits, and those laws would look different if minority perspectives were
adequately represented and taken into consideration. A prosecutor's voluntary
exercise of discretion to enforce laws that reflect hostility or calloused indifference
to the aspirations of minority communities makes that prosecutor an unintentional,
but very real agent of institutional racism.
However, prosecutors can utilize their discretionary functions, particularly their
power over charging and plea bargaining, to mitigate the harshness of criminal
laws that reflect the under-representation of minorities within American political
institutions. Identifying precisely which laws and criminal penalties are racially
unjust requires a complex contextual judgment, and it is beyond the scope of this
Article to provide detailed critiques of specific areas of law. However, scholars
concerned about racial disparities in the criminal-justice system have identified
and criticized a wide range of laws that have severe and foreseeable racial impacts,
including minor public-order offenses (like graffiti) ;252 the stiff penalties attached
to drug laws generally,2 53 and especially the exorbitant penalties that the federal
system attaches to crack cocaine offenses (for which almost all of the defendants
are black) compared to the much lighter penalties for powder cocaine offenses (for
which a larger proportion of defendants are white).25 4 Many commentators have
also argued that a general shift away from retributive goals toward rehabilitation,
and a new focus on violent offenses instead of nonviolent crimes, would go a long
way toward alleviating the strains that mass incarceration has inflicted on struggling black communities.25 5
Although I agree with many of these proposals, I offer them here only as
illustrations. Color-conscious prosecutors must use their expertise in crime and
punishment to form their own judgments about which criminal laws resonate with
justice, and which ones are crippling black communities or otherwise generating
social problems. Forming judgments in this area is unavoidably challenging, but it
is essential if prosecutors are to serve as counterweights to, rather than agents of,
institutional racism.

251.
252.
253.
254.
(1995).
255.

See supra Part I.D.1.
See, e.g., Capers,supra note 69, at 69-70.
See, e.g., Tonry & Melewski, supra note 232, at 23-29.
See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
See, e.g., Butler,Affirmative Action, supra note 89, at 877-78.
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D. Color-ConsciousTrial Strategy
Even when a prosecutor has made the decision to go forward with a criminal
case against a defendant, he or she must still be vigilant to ensure that the
defendant is treated fairly at trial and that the jury convicts (if at all) on the basis of
the facts of the crime, not the defendant's race. This principle has practical
implications from the very beginning of trial through sentencing. During jury
selection, prosecutors should cease the common practice of striking jurors who
share the defendant's race.25 6 In fact, they should do precisely the opposite:
whenever possible, prosecutors should coordinate with defense counsel to empanel a jury that is genuinely representative of our diverse society and, in
particular, of the racial groups involved in the immediate case.25 7
Once a jury is selected, it is essential that the arguments of the lawyers,
testimony of witnesses, and instructions by the judge be presented in a way that is
least likely to activate any implicit racial biases that jurors may hold. I have
previously explained that prosecutors are best able to minimize the influence of
bias on their own decision-making when they acknowledge their stereotypes and
consciously work to counteract them.2 5 8 This Section will show that the same is
true of jurors. Stereotypes are most potent when subtle racial dynamics lace
through the fabric of the trial and are permitted to go unnamed and unchecked.
Conversely, bias is least salient when the racial dimensions of the case are
confronted directly and jurors are reminded by the lawyers and the judge of their
duty to render a verdict that is not based on the defendant's race. Thus, colorconscious prosecution is essential for upholding the dignity of criminal defendants, the integrity of the trial process, and the truth-seeking function of the jury's
verdict. 259
1. Selecting a Racially BalancedJury
Racial politics and tensions lurk just beneath the surface of jury selection in
many criminal trials involving black defendants. Historically, the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the venire "was an incredibly efficient
final racial filter." 2 6 0 In 1963, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that "Negroes are
commonly on trial venires but are always struck by attorneys in selecting the trial
jury." 26 1 Today, the situation is much improved, but recent studies continue to
reveal that many prosecutors and defense attorneys heavily emphasize race in

256. Cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors
from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race).

257. See infra Part II.C.I.
258. See supraPart II.B.
259. See infra Part II.D.2.
260. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge'sPerspective,64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 809, 829 (1997).
261. Swain v. State, 156 S.2d 368, 375 (Ala. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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deciding which jurors are likely to favor their case, and which they should strike
from the jury pool.26 2 The motivation behind this practice is not so much hostility
toward members of the excluded racial group as stereotypes about "how . . . black
and non-black jurors view issues of criminal responsibility, culpability, and

punishment." 2 6 3
Much like with racial profiling, 26 there is some statistical foundation for these
stereotypes. Studies have shown that in certain situations, the racial identity of
jurors is one factor that helps predict the decisions they will ultimately reach.26 5
There are a number of different explanations for this phenomenon. A common
hypothesis offered by many observers is that some black jurors, angry about the
injustice reflected in certain areas of the substantive criminal law and the
discriminatory enforcement of those laws, favor verdicts that effectively nullify
those laws. 2 6 6
Jury nullification occurs when the jury delivers a "not guilty" verdict despite
concluding that, factually speaking, the defendant is guilty as charged. 6 When a
jury chooses nullification, it is sending the message that applicable statutes (or the
mode of enforcing those laws, i.e. racial profiling or aggressive order-maintenance
policing) are in need of reform and that, in their present form, they are not worthy
of being enforced.2 68 There is a small but vocal movement among blacks to
promote jury nullification, in cases involving nonviolent crime, as a racial
self-help strategy for protecting black defendants and communities against the
onslaught of mass incarceration. 2 6 9

262. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal
and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 3, 121-22 (2001) ("Our findings indicate that venire member race
was a major determinant in the use of peremptories by both prosecutors and defense counsel, with the prosecution
disproportionately striking black venire members and defense counsel disproportionately striking non-blacks."
(footnotes omitted)).
263. Id. at 122.
264. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors'Receptivityto Mitigationin CapitalCases: The Effect of
Jurors',Defendants', and Victims'Race in Combination, 28 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 529,542 (2004) ("[W]hen Black
jurors are faced with a situation where an in-group member, Black defendant, is faced with killing an out-group
member, White victim,... they become significantly more receptive to mitigation than their White colleagues on
the jury.").
266. See Paul Butler, RaciallyBased Jury Nullification:Black Powerin the CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE
L.J. 677, 679 (1995) [hereinafter Butler, Jury Nullification] ("[L]awyers and judges increasingly perceive that
some African-American jurors vote to acquit black defendants for racial reasons, a decision sometimes expressed
as the juror's desire not to send yet another black man to jail." (footnote omitted)).
267. See generally Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullificationand the Modem Jury Trial, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 959, 959 (2006) ("While nominally the jury is only a finder of fact, criminal juries occasionally
defy their instructions and oaths by acquitting a defendant they believe to be guilty-jury nullification.").
268. Cf id. ("When juries refuse to convict on the basis of what they think are unjust laws, they are performing
their duty as jurors." (citing Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification":When, May, and Should a Jury
Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 239, 240 (1993))).
269. The seminal thinker behind this movement is Paul Butler. See Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 266.
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Race-based jury nullification does take place in a small subset of cases,
predominantly in drug cases, 2 7 0 but it is not the only or even the most important
way that blacks contribute a unique perspective to the jury pool. In the social
context of present-day America, blacks experience many aspects of life differently
than whites do, and these experiences shape their understanding and interpretation
of ambiguous facts. Whites are not subjected to suspicion by their neighbors,
strangers, shop owners, taxi-cab drivers, or police on account of their race;
however, a large number of blacks have had these and other degrading experiences. 27 1 Furthermore, because America remains a predominantly de facto segregated society, whites rarely have the chance to interact with blacks to learn of these
experiences, whereas blacks typically grow up in the company of other blacks who
share stories of race-related suspicion and abuse at the hands of non-blacks. 27 2
These disparate collective experiences shape the way blacks and whites process
factual data that is central to a criminal case. Although test data suggests that both
blacks and whites harbor some implicit bias against blacks in dimensions that are
pertinent to criminal cases, the negative associations tend to be far less severe
among blacks than whites.2 73 Consequently, in cases involving black defendants,
black jurors are better equipped to pick up on potentially exculpatory or mitigating
facts that might be missed by jurors whose factual perception is filtered through a
prioricognitive assumptions about the criminal tendencies of blacks.2 74
Furthermore, polling data consistently reveals that whites generally have a deep
trust for the police and the fundamental fairness of America's criminal-justice
system.27 5 Blacks, by contrast, are much more likely to doubt the veracity of police
testimony and suspect the worst from criminal justice.2 76
The point of all this is not to suggest that the perspective blacks bring to the table
is more valuable than that of whites. On the contrary, it is that the two perspectives
are diverse and complementary. Each is capable of detecting aspects of reality that
are relevant to some criminal cases, but each also suffers from blind spots and,
taken in isolation, is vulnerable to exaggeration and a slanted view of the facts. An
all-white jury may have difficulty spotting deception by police officers and their
informants, whereas an all-black jury may unjustly discount the testimony of an

270. See, e.g., CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DocrRINE 149 (1998).

271. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the suspicions and stereotypes of potential
employers, mortgage lenders, cab drivers, and others).
272. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the dimensions of de facto segregation that
continue to afflict America's residential areas, schools, hospitals, churches, and other social institutions).
273. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing the implicit white preference suggested by
results of various IATs).
274. For a discussion of how confirmation bias leads individuals with racial stereotypes to over-emphasize
incriminating information and fail to perceive or remember exculpatory evidence, see Bodenhausen, supra note
135 (testing process models of stereotype use in a mock jury trial setting).
275. See, e.g., Georgia Ackerman et al., Crime Rates and Confidence in the Police: America's Changing
Attitudes Toward Crime and Police: 1972-1999, 28 J. Soc. & PUB. WELFARE 43 (2001).
276. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Race, Classand Drugs,98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1796-97 (1998).
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honest law-enforcement agent who is diligently doing his/her job.
Both of these propositions are over-generalizations that do not extend to every
all-white or all-black jury, but they do capture genuine statistical trends that reflect
277
the varied experiences of many blacks and whites in contemporary America.
Consequently, the ideal jury would be racially diverse so as to represent a broader
range of knowledge and experience that is relevant in reaching a factually accurate
and morally just verdict. The racial composition of a jury is by no means its most
important characteristic, but it is a factor that cannot be ignored.
It is a lamentable fact, however, that in cases involving black defendants,
prosecutors all too frequently use their peremptory challenges to disproportionately strike blacks from the jury pool, with the goal of excluding unique black
perspectives from the jury's deliberations; conversely, defense attorneys more
often blacklist white jurors.278 Although it is unconstitutional for prosecuting
attorneys to expressly base their strikes on the race of a juror, the legal test erected
by the Supreme Court for detecting discriminatory jury selection is lax and
forgiving. 279 The prosecutor need only provide some sort of race-neutral explanation for the challenge-not necessarily a plausible or sensible one-in order to
evade constitutional scrutiny.2 80 As a result, in many cases, racial discrimination is
at its most conscious and potent before the trial even begins. Perceptive jurors pick
up on what is going on, and the attorneys, intentionally or not, are effectively
teaching the jury-and the interested public-to pick sides and polarize into
camps on the basis of their race.
This state of affairs is unacceptable, and it must end. Prosecutors should
immediately cease the practice of excluding black jurors as a way of securing a
jury sympathetic to the government's case. Fortunately, many prosecutors already
appear to have made a conscious commitment to avoid racial discrimination injury
selection. However, even these well-intentioned prosecutors can do more. They
should actively seek to create racially diverse juries that are genuinely representative of the racial groups involved in their cases and, more generally, in American
society. This would not only bolster the accuracy of fact-finding in criminal trials,
but it would also build trust between blacks and whites, improve the legitimacy of
the criminal-justice process in the eyes of black Americans, and model racial
integration and collaboration instead of polarization and tension.
2. Color-ConsciousAdvocacy
Earlier in this Part, I explained that the most promising strategy for prosecutors
to diminish the influence of racial bias on their decisions is through racial
277. Cf OGLETREE, JR., supra note 171.

278. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the racial identity ofjurors).
279. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986) (describing the legal test that governs the application
of the Equal Protection Clause to race-based peremptory challenges).
280. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-78 (1995) (per curiam).
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awareness, not denial.28 1 The same is true for jurors. They, too, are more likely to

be swayed by implicit stereotypes when the racial dimensions of a case remain
unnamed. By contrast, jurors are better able to overcome their partiality when they
can identify it and consciously resist the grip that it holds over their cognitive
processing of information.2 82
Thus, not all references to race during a criminal trial undermine the integrity of
the fact-finding process. Instead, when there is a serious risk that the implicit
biases of jurors may be activated by subtle racial triggers during a trial, it may
actually "enhance the rationality of the decisionmaking process for attorneys
explicitly to challenge factfinders to confront their biases."28 3 This vital insight
from cognitive-bias research provides the central justification for color-conscious
legal advocacy, or, as Gary Blasi has called it, "advocacy against the stereotype."2 84
Jody David Armour has helpfully illustrated the nature of color-conscious
advocacy by recounting the facts and closing argument from a 1925 murder
trial. 2 85 The black defendant in the case, Dr. Ossian Sweet, moved into a
predominantly white neighborhood.28 6 The family correctly anticipated that they
would be confronted with anti-integrationist threats and violence for intruding
upon a white neighborhood, so they came prepared with weapons for protection.2 87
The angry white community quickly mobilized itself.288 A crowd of several
hundred hostile whites surrounded the house and threw stones while uttering racial
slurs.28 9 Wen a large stone broke an upstairs window and the crowd made a
sudden movement, Dr. Sweet fired a warning shot above the heads of the mob,
killing one of its members.2 9 0 He was arrested and charged with murder.2 9 1

281. See supraPart II.B (explaining that awareness of bias helps people overcome it).
282. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptionsof Guilt and
DispositionalAttributions, 26 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1376 (2000) (finding that white jurors
convict black defendants less frequently in cases that are "race-salient" than those in which the racial dynamics
are more subtle).
283. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal DecisionmakersBreak the PrejudiceHabit, 83
CAL. L. REv. 733, 737 (1995).
284. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 1241, 1241 (2002).
285. See ARMOUR, supra note 76, at 141.
286. Id.
287. See id. ("When Dr. Ossian H. Sweet and his wife moved into the neighborhood with their baby daughter,
they knew that other Blacks who had bought homes in White neighborhoods had been forced to move by
'Improvement Associations.' Accordingly, Dr. Sweet brought along his brothers, several friends, and an ample
supply of guns and ammunition.").
288. See id. ("Two nights after [Dr. Sweet's] arrival, a large White crowd, estimated at several hundred,
gathered around the house and began throwing stones at the house amid cries of 'Niggers.').
289. Id.
290. Id.
29 1. Id.
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Clarence Darrow, one of the most famous lawyers in the history of the NAACP,
defended the case in front of an all-white jury with a self-defense theory.292 He
faced a serious uphill battle, not because the facts disfavored the defense-they did
not-but because many whites in early twentieth-century America held strong
implicit and explicit beliefs about race that were at odds with the idea that blacks
should be permitted to venture into white neighborhoods and expect to avoid
retribution.29 3
Rather than ignoring the obvious racial dimensions of the case in his closing
argument, Darrow made powerful rhetorical use of a racially themed counterfactual to explain to the jurors how the race of the defendant and the victims shaped
their moral perception of the case:
I insist that there is nothing but prejudice in this case; that if it was reversed and
11 Whites had shot and killed a Black while protecting their home and lives
against a mob of Blacks, nobody would have dreamed of having them indicted.
They would have been given medals instead.294
He explicitly acknowledged the probable racial prejudice of the jurors-"l haven't
any doubt but that every one of you is prejudiced against color people"-and urged
them to "guard against" that prejudice. 2 9 5 He urged cross-racial empathy and
identification: "Here were eleven colored men, penned up in the house. Put
yourselves in their place.... Suppose you were Black.... Suppose you had to
watch every point of contact with your neighbor and remember your color..... 296
Dr. Sweet was found not guilty by the jury, which makes his trial "a compelling
narrative of hope and redemption that stands in marked contrast to the pessimism
of many current discussions of prejudice in the courtroom." 29 7 Admittedly, the
story is just one data point, not decisive proof that can be generalized to all cases;
furthermore, the characteristics of modem racism and the racial dynamics of
twenty-first-century criminal cases are far different from those of one hundred
years ago. Nonetheless, the general principles and rhetorical devices of colorconscious advocacy that are reflected in Darrow's closing argument--open and
candid recognition of the potency of racial stereotypes, morally eloquent exhortations to guard against those stereotypes, and the cultivation of interracial empathy 298-have enduring relevance and powerful contemporary applications in
modem criminal practice.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See id. at 141-42 (discussing Darrow's participation in Dr. Sweet's trial and his trial strategy).
See id. at 142-43.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
See id. at 141-43.
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Adversarial norms would suggest that, insofar as color-conscious advocacy on
behalf of criminal defendants is necessary at all, the job should be left to the
defense attorney, not the prosecutor. However, there is simply no substitute for the
rhetorical power of anti-racist advocacy coming from the mouth of the prosecutor,
who, unlike Darrow, is viewed as the defendant's adversary. Efforts by defense
attorneys to address racial themes are also very important, but, like Johnny
Cochran's attack on the credibility of the then-police officer, Mark Fuhrman, in the
O.J. Simpson case, such efforts are frequently viewed as "irrelevant, self-serving,
and maliciously advanced." 2 9 9 Color-conscious interventions by prosecutors (or
joint efforts by prosecutors and defense attorneys) on behalf of criminal defendants
cannot be dismissed as "playing the race card"3 so easily. They have the potential
to surprise jurors and supply them with a moving and memorable reminder of their
obligation to reach a verdict that is fully based on facts and their sense of fairness,
not prejudice.
Still, it may be difficult to achieve this goal in practice due to restrictive judicial
interpretations of the rules of evidence and the genuine importance of excluding
improper references to race. Attorneys may only make arguments based on the
evidence introduced during the trial, 3 0 1 and the only evidence that may be admitted
at trial is "relevant" evidence.30 2 Judges who are unable to understand the way in
which unconscious racial stereotypes shape our perception of the relevant evidence may fail to grasp when race becomes relevant to the jurors' evaluation of the
facts.
Furthermore, most defense attorneys would likely be presumptively suspicious
of any reference to race by the prosecution. The prosecutor would thus need to
assuage their fears and even promote collaboration by disclosing and agreeing
upon the precise nature of the proposed color-conscious intervention.
There are a number of ways that prosecutors can work in tandem with defense
attorneys to productively address racial issues with jurors without coming into
conflict with the rules of evidence. In many cases, the time to initiate a discussion
of the problem of racism with jurors is during voir dire. The informal question-andanswer format provides jurors with an opportunity to affirmatively declare to
themselves and others that they will guard against racial bias in their decisionmaking. Research has shown that "individuals who make public commitments to
behave in a certain manner are more likely to ultimately behave in that way."3 03

299. Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of
Legal Practice,95 MICH. L. REv. 766, 792 (1997).
300. See id. at 793 (discussing the vulnerability of defense attorneys to charges of "playing the race card" when
they engage in color-conscious advocacy).
301. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2011).
302. FED. R. EVID. 401(a)-(b) ("Evidence is relevant if: it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.").
303. JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALEs, Am. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 27
(2007).
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The point of asking jurors questions about whether they can deliver a racially
fair verdict is not primarily to identify and exclude jurors who are willing to affirm
their intention to make a race-based decision-this will virtually never happen.
Rather, the goal is to educate the typical juror about the problem of unconscious
racism and encourage the jury to make an affirmative commitment to guard against
it.
In some situations, it may be necessary for the prosecutor and/or defense
attorney to discuss with the jury the danger and inappropriateness of racially
biased decision-making after voir dire, during the trial. For example, if the
testimony of a witness implicates racial stereotypes-whether obvious or subtlethen it may be appropriate to ask the judge for a jury instruction underscoring the
inappropriateness of stereotypes and race-based decision-making in the courtroom. 3 0 Closing arguments present another under-utilized opportunity for intervention in cases implicating race: the prosecutor, when appealing to the jury to
deliver a guilty verdict, can simultaneously urge the jurors to ensure that their
verdict is based on the facts, not their racially coded perception of the facts.
Finally, race not only shapes the way jurors and others perceive black criminal
defendants, but also their assessment of crime victims, witnesses, and others
involved in the case. 30 5 Color-conscious advocacy is not merely a way to improve
the lot of black defendants within the criminal-justice system; rather, it upholds the
dignity of all those involved in a criminal trial, allies and adversaries alike. By
visibly and conscientiously attending to the racial fairness of criminal trials,
prosecutors can make important strides toward repairing the damaged legitimacy
of criminal justice in the eyes of the many blacks in America who view the
criminal law as something that is there to oppress instead of protect.o
III.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE TO COLOR-CONSCIOUS PROSECUTION

As individual prosecutors decide whether to incorporate my proposals into their
everyday practice, they must consider not only their own views about race and
justice, but also the external constraints that influence their work. Their actions are
necessarily shaped by the institutional culture, expectations, and policies of the
304. See, e.g., Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of
Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 LAw & INEQ. 1, 56-57 (2007). One recent article has even suggested requiring potential
jurors to take an IAT in order to weed out unusually biased jurors and ameliorate the biases of the other jurors by
promoting awareness. See Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the
Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 139, 141 (2010). Whatever the wisdom of this
idea as a matter of theory, even the author acknowledged that "current norms and judicial culture" probably render
it unachievable in the foreseeable future. Id. at 169. Cautioning jurors about the reality of implicit bias, and asking
them whether they can confidently commit to reaching a racially equitable verdict, is more realistic within the
current ideological context of the American judiciary.
305. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 265, at 542.
306. For a discussion of polling data reflecting negative black views about the criminal-justice system, see
supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing blacks' greater likeliness to doubt the veracity of police
testimony and suspect the worst from criminal justice).
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prosecutor's office in which they work. A prosecutor's institutional context largely
determines which color-conscious interventions are realistically available to the
individual prosecutor.
In this Part, I explore how color-conscious prosecutors can navigate the
complexities of institutional resistance. I will also identify concrete ways that
prosecutorial offices can adjust their policies and practices so as to enable and
encourage their line prosecutors to pursue racial justice.
A. Negotiating the InstitutionalDynamics of Race andAdversarialism
This Section describes the challenges that institutional culture and policy
present for prosecutors who wish to integrate color-conscious insights into their
practice, and how they can constructively approach these problems.
1. Office Policies and Supervisor Expectations
Some of the dimensions of color-conscious prosecution that I described in Part
II are unlikely to come into conflict with institutional policy. For instance, it is
unimaginable that a prosecutor's supervisors or office policies would condemn his
or her decision to take an IAT or to practice cognitive de-biasing techniques.
Furthermore, even though racially discriminatory jury selection is fairly common,
it is not actively promoted at the institutional level-nor could it be, due to
constitutional restrictions.3 07 It lies within the control of the individual prosecutor
to decide whether to strike black jurors on the ground of race, or whether to cease
the practice.
However, other facets of color-conscious prosecution are more controversial
and therefore more likely to generate institutional resistance. For instance, confronting police officers about racial profiling or dismissing charges on the basis of
racial-justice considerations have real potential to draw the attention and ire of a
prosecutor's supervisors. Academics crafting theoretical scholarship can choose to
ignore these realities, but prosecutors cannot. Their jobs are on the line, and they
cannot hope to make longstanding positive contributions unless they are willing to
respectfully operate within and interact with the culture, policies and practices of
the office in which they work.
Nonetheless, prosecutors can take steps to negotiate the obstacles presented by
their work environment. This task is a delicate one, so it must be approached with
sensitivity and creativity. When a prosecutor believes that the expectations of a
supervisor conflict with the demands of racial justice, the prosecutor should raise
his or her concerns with the supervisor in an open-minded and non-condemnatory
fashion. Prosecutors tend to be talented advocates, and a prosecutor with a keen

307. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race); see also supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text
(discussing race-based strikes in the jury context).

2012]

REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1591

understanding of how race influences criminal-justice processes in contemporary
America could make a strong case for color-conscious interventions on a case-bycase basis.
These difficult conversations should not be approached in a confrontational,
accusatory way. This method of discourse would not only be ineffective, but it
would also miss the point. As I have explained in previous Parts, racial bias is
widespread and potent, but it is also, in most cases, subconscious and unintentional.3 os Understanding the psychological and cultural roots of contemporary
racism "obviates the need for fault, as traditionally conceived," because "[w]e
cannot be individually blamed for unconsciously harboring attitudes that are
inescapable in a culture permeated with racism." 3 Thus, color-conscious prosecutors should focus on "persuading" their supervisors and peers, "not as adversaries,
but as equal partners" in promoting racial equity. 310
Similarly, if a prosecutor believes that office-wide policies or priorities unnecessarily produce racially inequitable outcomes, he or she can press for reform of
those policies. The prosecutor can seek out positions with greater influence over
policymaking and share his or her ideas with those who do. Even as a line
prosecutor with no direct input into policy, an individual can make positive
contributions by, for example, suggesting and offering to lead a task force to study
the costs and benefits-including race-related consequences-of potentially unjust
policies or priorities. 3 1 1 Needless to say, such a prosecutor will not always win
these battles, particularly in the short term. Yet, his or her efforts to raise awareness
and highlight dimensions of injustice that might otherwise get overlooked has real
potential to plant the seeds for future change at the institutional level.
2. Institutional Culture
Even when no specific office-wide policy demands that prosecutors embrace an
adversarial and/or color-blind stance in a particular area, patterns of discourse and
other dimensions of culture within the office can interpose additional obstacles.
Within some offices, it is common for prosecutors to speak of criminal defendants
in dehumanizing and degrading ways 3 12 and to celebrate the single-minded pursuit

308. See supraPart I.C.
309. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317, 325-26 (1987).
310. Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors,2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512,
514 (2007).
311. Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairnessin the CriminalJustice System: The Role of the Prosecutor,39 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 202, 222-24 (2007) (discussing examples of how prosecutorial task forces that investigated
intra-office racial bias helped spur reform initiatives).
312. See, e.g., Lawton P. Cummings, Can an Ethical Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor?A Social Cognitive
Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 2139, 2154-56 (2010) (discussing the common practice of
depersonalizing defendants within prosecutors' offices).
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Consequently,
of convictions and high sentences instead of fair outcomes.
"even the best of the prosecutors . . . are easily caught up in the hunt mentality of
an aggressive office" and "corrupted by the institutional ethic of combat." 31 4
However, prosecutors need not passively accept all of the cultural dynamics of
their institutional environment. They help to shape that culture, for better or worse,
in a variety of ways. Individual prosecutors influence the cultural trajectory of their
office through their discretionary and discursive choices, such as the way they
address race, characterize criminal defendants, conceptualize their professional
goals, build community identity, and mentor less experienced prosecutors.
Prosecutors contribute to a positive institutional culture when they educate
others about issues of race in informative yet non-condemnatory ways, measure
success in terms of fairness, and speak about defendants and witnessesparticularly blacks and other members of disadvantaged social groups-in respectful ways that recognize their humanity and dignity (without, of course, approving
of their crimes). Conversely, they foster a destructive cultural dynamic when they
use dehumanizing and racially coded language to describe criminal defendants, or
when they evaluate themselves and their peers by the sheer quantity of convictions
they secure from juries or the severity of the sentences imposed by judges. The
overall culture of a prosecution office is merely the sum of its parts. A single
prosecutor cannot single-handedly overhaul the prevailing cultural dynamics of
the office, but he or she can model an alternative way of envisioning the
prosecutorial role that others may find compelling and attractive.
B. Color-ConsciousProsecution at the InstitutionalLevel
The last Section has shown that individual prosecutors are far from powerless to
implement color-conscious insights into their work and to encourage co-workers
to do the same. However, the potential for color-conscious prosecution at the
individual level does not obviate the need for institutional reform. This Section
introduces three areas in which prosecution offices can sharpen their commitment
to racial justice: training and performance criteria, data collection and dissemination, and community prosecution.
1. PersonnelManagement and Supervision
The most central way in which prosecution offices construct their institutional
identity lies in how they choose to train, guide, and evaluate their trial attorneys. To
begin with, the manner in which new recruits are trained is vital because it "sets a
313. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETucs 355,
388 (2001) ("In view of the institutional culture of prosecutor's offices and the culture of the adversary system
generally, it is perhaps inevitable that the overriding interest of prosecutors would be winning." (footnotes
omitted)).
314. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassionin a PassionatePursuit, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1702 (2000).

2012]

REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1593

tone for the office and helps to inculcate new lawyers into the culture of the
office.""' The content and quantity of training varies among jurisdictions, but the
typical prosecutorial training program "concentrate[s] exclusively on what one
might consider traditional advocacy skills."3 1 6
However, depending on the resources available for training within a particular
jurisdiction, prosecution offices should consider incorporating lessons about
implicit racial bias (and perhaps even request that new prosecutors take a short
IAT), detecting and responding to racial profiling, and teaching the importance of
not only securing convictions and severe sentences, but also fair outcomes-in
particular, outcomes that are not the result of racial prejudice. Ideally, training
would guide new prosecutors in the just exercise of their discretion by discussing
not only the benefits of rigorous enforcement of criminal law, including incarceration in appropriate cases, but also the costs of mass incarceration and the potential
benefits of rehabilitation-oriented alternatives to prison time.
Furthermore, prosecution offices shape the incentives and vision of their
attorneys in the performance criteria they use for decisions regarding hiring,
promotion, retention, and supervision. Many offices place overwhelming emphasis
on simple and adversarial measures of success, such as the number of convictions
secured and the length of sentences imposed.3 '7 However, this sort of onedimensional performance evaluation teaches prosecutors to pursue victory at all
costs, and it punishes prosecutors for calibrating their aggressiveness to the
demands of justice. Prosecution offices can make great strides in the direction of
better accommodating justice-seeking, color-conscious prosecution by abandoning over-simplistic and oppositional performance criteria and instead conducting a
more holistic assessment of their attorneys' understanding of and abilities to
pursue justice.
Finally, institutional priorities and guidelines structure and limit the discretion
of individual prosecutors in their charging decisions, plea offers, and sentencing
recommendations in ways that have real potential either to promote racial justice
or exacerbate current disparities. Each prosecuting agency must make crucial
decisions regarding which subsets of the vast body of criminal law to make their
priorities, what punishments to seek when prosecuting those laws (i.e., the death
penalty, incarceration, probation, community services, fines, and others), and how
to allocate decision-making authority in these areas between the elected prosecutor, intermediate supervisory attorneys, and individual prosecutors. The decision to
vigorously prosecute and prioritize drug offenses, immigration violations, and
public-order offenses will have a dramatically different set of costs (and benefits)
to minority communities than a focus on violent crime, white collar crime, and
315. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 337 (2002).
316. Id. at 369.
317. See, e.g., Lisa M. Budzilowicz, Holding ProsecutorsAccountable: What Is Successful Prosecutorial
Performanceand Why Should It Be Measured?, 41 PROSECUTOR 22, 26 (2007).
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public corruption. Each jurisdiction should make these difficult choices on the
basis of the needs of the local community, taking into full account any stresses that
law enforcement and mass incarceration may already present for parts of the
community.
2. Data Collection and Racial Impact Statements
Another promising avenue for elevating racial awareness at the institutional
level is data collection and racial impact statements. Given the widespread decline
in overt racial prejudice (by contrast with unconscious racial bias),3 1 8 I suspect that
very few modem prosecutors actively desire to exacerbate racial inequalities.
Instead, it seems likely that many individual prosecutors would seriously consider
the racial consequences of their actions if only they knew what those consequences
were. However, jurisdiction-specific information about the racial impacts of
prosecutorial decision-making is generally not available.3 19 It is unrealistic to
expect that busy prosecutors will take the time to investigate these matters on their
own.
Thus, institutional collection and dissemination of data about the racial impacts
of various prosecutorial functions is essential. Several prosecution offices around
the country have already blazed a trail in this area by partnering with the Vera
Institute of Justice's Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, which helps prosecution offices establish methods for gathering data regarding the racial impact of
discretionary charging decisions. 3 2 0 By making an office-wide commitment to
maintaining and disseminating data about the race of criminal defendants and
tracking how race correlates with outcomes across a wide range of discretionary
decisions, individual prosecutors and their supervisors will become more aware of
the danger of unconscious racism. As I discussed in previous Parts, this awareness
is the first and most crucial step toward ameliorating the influence of implicit bias
over discretionary decision-making.32 1
Furthermore, the individuals responsible for setting office-wide policies and
priorities in prosecution offices should make a routine practice of calculating the
racial impact of existing policies and alternatives to them. Many scholars have
recently begun calling upon state legislators to require state governmental agencies
to create racial impact statements, predicting the likely effects of policy proposals

318. See supra Part I.C.1.
319. See WAYNE MCKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING DATA TO
ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 4 (2009), http://www.vera.org/download?file= 3482/Using-data-toadvance-fairness-in-criminal-prosecution.pdf ("Prosecution offices often use electronic case management systems to follow the progress of their cases. Such systems are rarely designed to marshal the aggregate information
required to track disparity, however.").
Discretion,VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.
320. See ProsecutionandRacial JusticeProgran/Prosecutorial
vera.org/project/prosecution-and-racial-justice (last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (describing the program and its work
within three jurisdictions-Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Mecklenburg, North Carolina; and San Diego, California).
321. See supra Parts IC, IIB, H.D.2.

2012]

REIMAGINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1595

on racial minorities before adopting those proposals. 32 2 The idea has gained
considerable momentum with its endorsement by the Model Penal Code Sentencing Project 323 and legislatures in Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Connecticut. 3 2 4
Although these programs are still "too new to know how [they] will fare," 3 25 they
suggest a promising way for prosecution offices to determine how their current and
future policies benefit and burden black communities that are already struggling.
3. Community Prosecution
Prosecuting agencies should also deepen their commitment to community
prosecution as a way of entering into productive dialogue with the demographics
that they protect and indict. 3 2 6 Experiments with community prosecution began
during the past two decades, 327 and as of 2003, a survey conducted by the
American Prosecutors Research Institute found that "nearly half of all prosecutors'
offices engage in some activity defined as community prosecution."3 2 8 The
defining feature of community-prosecution initiatives is "a proactive approach to
addressing crime and quality-of-life issues that brings prosecutors together with
residents to identify problems and solutions."3 29
The content and scale of community-prosecution programs varies considerably
between jurisdictions. Some initiatives have done "little more than shake hands
and hold meetings, in a semblance of engagement that yields no gains in public
safety." 3 30 Others, however, have developed meaningful channels of communication between prosecutors and communities impacted by crime and criminal-law
enforcement. 3 3' Consequently, prosecutors have become "more willing to divert
both juvenile and adult offenders, even felony offenders, into alternatives to

322. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements, 23 CRIM. JUST. 16 (2009).
323. See Kevin R. Reitz, DemographicImpact Statements, O'Connor'sWarning, and the Mysteries of Prison
Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 690-96 (2009) (discussing racial impact
statements among selected legal-policy debates within the Model Penal Code Sentencing Project).
324. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARcERATION By RACE AND ETHNIcrTY 18 (2007) (discussing the use of racial impact statements as part of "race neutral"
policies), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
325. Reitz, supra note 323, at 694.
326. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors,90 CAL. L. REv. 1465, 1469 (2002) ("Communityprosecution programs advance the civic and dignitary interests of victims, offenders, and communities of color by
affording opportunities for citizen-state collaboration and by encouraging grassroots justice initiatives.").
327. For a brief history of the community-prosecution movement, see Thompson, supra note 315, at 338-44.
328. NAT'L DIsT. ATTORNEY'S Ass'N & NAT'L CTR. FOR CMTY. PROSECUTION, KEY PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROSECUTION 2 (2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/final~key-principles.updatedjan_2009.pdf.
329. M. ELAINE NUGENT ET AL., AM. PROSECUToRs RESEARCH INsT., THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION:
COMMUNITY PROSECUTION vs. TRADITIONAL PROSECUTION APPROACHES 1 (2004).
330. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining CriminalJustice, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 953, 982.
331. See, e.g., Walter J. Dickey & Peggy A. McGarry, The Searchfor Justiceand Safety Through Community
Engagement: Community Justice and Community Prosecution, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 313 (2006) (describing
community policing and prosecution programs in parts of Milwaukee, Chicago, Minneapolis, and elsewhere, and
concluding that they "add great value in the worlds they inhabit").
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incarceration, as can be seen in the proliferation of problem-solving courts, most
notably drug courts."3 32 Furthermore, this collaboration has helped to shift the
metric of success for prosecutors away from convictions and toward crime
reduction, public safety, and community healing.33 3
Community prosecution is not without its drawbacks and critics. In particular,
many outreach initiatives are designed in such a way that prosecutors only meet
subgroups within the community, such as crime prevention groups (i.e., Mothers
Against Drunk Driving) or victims. 3 34 It is crucial that outreach extend not only to
natural allies, but also to other members of the community-such as mothers of
juvenile offenders, ex-offenders who have reentered the community, and even
gang members-in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the entire
community and the appropriate set of prosecutorial strategies for meeting that
community's needs.335
The central principles of community prosecution-direct engagement with the
community and an approach to crime that focuses on problem solving rather than
punishment-should not simply be "an 'add-on' to the case processing mission,"
but rather should pervade the "entire operational structure" of prosecution offices.336 However, many prosecutors continue to resist the evolution toward a
community-prosecution model, complaining that it is a waste of resources,
requires them to perform work for which they are not trained, and involves "social
work," which is not viewed as a "real" prosecutorial function. 3 Prosecution
offices can gradually reconfigure these entrenched cultural norms by changing
their personnel selection and promotion criteria, 3 % revising their training priorities,33 9 and involving a larger subset of their trial prosecutors in community
initiatives.
CONCLUSION

With remarkably few exceptions, commentators who are concerned about mass
incarceration and the racial inequities generated by the criminal-justice system
have given little thought to how well-meaning prosecutors can help the situation.
Many have even rejected the possibility that prosecutors are capable of making
positive contributions to racial justice, given the current state of the substantive

332. Charles J.Hynes, The Evolving Prosecutor:Broadening the Vision, Expanding the Role, 24 CluM. JusT. 1,
40-41 (2009).
333. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors,91
MARQ. L. REv. 9, 35 (2007).
334. Cf Thompson, supra note 315, at 358-59 ("[A] prosecutor should not be content merely to secure the
participation of local representatives of Mothers Against Drunk Driving.").
335. See id.
336. Taslitz, JudgingJena'sD.A., supra note 19, at 454.
337. Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution,40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1125, 1129 (2005).
338. See id. at 1130.
339. See Thompson, supra note 315, at 370-71.
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laws they must enforce and the professional pressures they are under to seek
convictions and severe sentences above all else.340
A small group of scholars have recently begun to contribute important insights
and suggestions regarding how prosecutors can contribute to racial justice.3 4 1 In
this Article, I have articulated a theoretical vision of the prosecutorial role-a
justice-seeking, color-conscious understanding of the prosecutor's professional
obligations-that unifies the insights of these scholars and supplies a normative
foundation for prosecutors to actively promote racial equity.3 42 I have explored a
variety of concrete, high-impact ways that prosecutors can work toward that
goal.3 43 I have identified ways in which prosecutors can realistically implement at
least some aspects of color-conscious prosecution despite the institutional constraints under which they work. 34 Finally, I have shown how prosecutorial offices
can create an institutional environment that not only accommodates, but actively
promotes, racially equitable prosecution. 34 5
The chasm that separates those who value prosecutors and their function in
American society, on the one hand, and those who lament the severe racial
disparities in the criminal-justice system, on the other, has persisted for too long.
The latter group has focused so intently on criticizing the arbitrariness and
potential for bias in prosecutorial and police discretion-which, as I have discussed, is a valid concern 34 6-that it has largely overlooked the opportunity to help
well-meaning prosecutors re-envision their role. My hope is that this Article will
help lessen the division between these two groups and substitute in its place a
constructive dialogue about how prosecutors can use their power as decisionmakers and advocates in the service of both public order and racial justice.
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